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ANSWERING CANADIAN TAX QUESTIONS: AN INTRODUCTION TO TAX LAW RESEARCH§  
SAS ANSARI* 
The hardest thing in the world to understand is the income tax. 
- Albert Einstein1 
ABSTRACT	  
Income taxation is a complicated area of law that requires a researcher to master not only a large volume of complex 
legislation, but because of its ‘accessory-law’ nature also requires good knowledge of many other areas of law (both 
statutes and common law).  This paper provides an introduction to tax law research in the Canadian context.  It 
begins by introducing the tax research process in Part 1 before moving on to discuss how to find the law and 
material with legally enforceable consequences in Part 2.  The paper, in part 3, discusses primary sources of tax law, 
and explains how to read, understand, interpret, and use these sources.  Part 4 discussed secondary sources of tax 
law, focousing on government produced materials, before bringing the entire tax law research process together in 
Part 5.   
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§ Each of the sections and discussions in this paper could be greatly expanded.  This paper should be used as an 
introduction only and not as an exhaustive guide.   
* Sas Ansari is a PhD Candidate (taxation) at Osgoode Hall Law School.  Sas holds an LL.M. from Osgoode Hall 
Law School, York University, as well as J.D. (with Business Law certification), B.Ed., and B.Sc. degrees from the 
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his Canadian tax case comments and summaries at http://ita-annotated.ca/RecentDecisions .   
The author would like to thank Justin Kutyan, Neil Brooks, David Sherman, and Saul Templeton for reading and 
commenting on earlier drafts of this paper.  
1 This quote is attributed to Albert Einstein in a 1963 letter written by Leo Mattersdorf, published in Time magazine.  
See http://quoteinvestigator.com/2011/03/07/einstein-income-taxes/.   
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1. Introduction  
Solving legal problems is what lawyers do every day, and solving tax law problems is 
what tax lawyers do every day.  Becoming comfortable and proficient in finding answers to legal 
problems can be a painful process.  The prospect of examining a statute, such as the Income Tax 
Act,2 so as to find the answer to a question can be intimidating, and the act of reading the statute 
itself is often arduous.  However, knowing how to get answers to particular tax law questions is a 
basic requirement of tax practice, whether the end goal is tax planning,3 tax litigation,4 or tax 
compliance.5  In short, it is the a pain that a lawyer will have to endure.   
Legal problem solving draws on a general set of skills required for problem solving and 
clear thinking. However, there are sets of unique skills that apply to the practice of law generally, 
and approaches that apply to tax practice specifically.  Legal problem solving requires that the 
lawyer distill the relevant facts, identify the legal issues, find the relevant and applicable law, and 
apply the facts to the law.  This simple-seeming process is both cyclical and far from simple.6  
Every legal problem has a different set of considerations, including: the purpose of the research,7 
the solution sought,8 and the forum/decision-maker/audience where the results will be 
presented/used.9  How research is conducted, what sources are emphasized, and how the results 
are presented will differ and depend on the specific considerations of each case facing the 
researcher.   
Successful legal problem solving requires one to take a systematic approach.10  One step 
in this systematic approach requires the researcher to identify, locate, and understand the 
                                                
2 Income Tax Act, RSC 1985 c 1 (5th Supp) (“ITA”) 
3 “Tax planning” is used here to refer generally to the determination of structural elements of a future transaction or 
event with the aim of obtaining the most “tax favourable” result possible.  With the growth of global 
interconnectedness of the real and financial economies, there has been growing debate as to what constitutes 
appropriate versus abusive tax planning.  See for example: David G Duff, “Tax Avoidance in the 21st Century” in 
Australian Business Tax Reform in Retrospect and Prospect, Chris Evans and Rick Krever, Eds (Thomson Reuters, 
2009), available online at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1457453 .  See also Daniel Deak, “International Tax Law and Tax 
Avoidance: A Case Study on Tax Havens and the Option of Ethics in a Global Economy” in Dal diritto financiario 
al diritto tributario; Studi in onore A. Amatucci, Volume 5, MA Plazas Vega, Ed, (Temis: Bogotá, 2011) pp 433-
482, available online at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2039631. 
4 “Tax litigation” is used here to refer generally to the resolution of tax disputes as between the taxpayer and the tax 
authority. This includes both administrative review/appeal steps at the Canada Revenue Agency level as well as 
appeals, actions, or applications to various courts.  
5 “Tax compliance” is used here to refer generally to all the procedural requirements needed to demonstrate 
adherence to the tax laws applicable to the tax filing person.  This includes all of the forms, elections, returns, and 
other materials required by the ITA, Regulations, and Canada Revenue Agency. 
6 The process is cyclical because the search for facts may give rise to new potential legal issues, and the legal 
research and identification of legal issues may give rise to the need for additional factual inquiry.   
7 There are three general categories that tax research will most often fall into, being research for purposes of: (i) tax 
planning; (ii) tax litigation; or (iii) tax compliance. 
8 For example: Is the research for purposes of a comfort letter to a client, an opinion letter as part of a business 
transaction, or in preparation for the fallout of an audit? 
9 The manner of presentation will differ when presenting and drafting, inter alia, a planning memorandum, a legal 
opinion, a notice of objection, or a factum for the court.  
10 For an overview of a systemic approach to solving legal problems, see Sas Ansari, “Introduction and Overview” 
(2012) available online at http://ita-annotated.ca/RecentDecisions/tax-research/introduction-and-overview/ .  In 
brief, there are 6 general steps: (1) obtaining all available and relevant facts and documents; (2) identifying the 
issues potentially raised by the facts and documents; (3) identifying the law (including interpretation sources) 
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appropriate law – in other words, conduct legal research.   However, before starting legal 
research, the researcher must first identify the legally relevant facts and the legal issues.11  Once 
this initial background is clarified, the researcher needs to develop a “Research Path”: Where to 
look, in what order, for what information, and to what effect?   
The tax issues identified are going to direct the development of the research path.  There 
are five (5) general categories that tax issues can fall into.  Identifying what category(-ies) the 
issue(s) fall(s) into will simplify the research process.  The five (5) general categories are:12 
1) Tax Rules;13 
a) Procedural; 
b) Substantive; 
c) Mandatory provisions; or 
d) Discretionary provisions; 
2) Legal and Interpretation Issues;14 
3) Calculation Issues;15 
a) Definition of formulas or description of variables; or 
b) Application of formulas; 
4) Accounting Issues;16 and  
5) Factual Issues.17 
This paper aims to provide the reader with a basic understanding of how to conduct 
Canadian tax law research, and thereby how to develop and follow through with a research path.  
It assumes that the researcher has identified the relevant facts and legal issues.  The primary 
focous is on addressing tax issues falling primarily into the category of (1) tax rules, and (2) legal 
                                                                                                                                                       
potentially applicable; (4) analyzing the law; (5) applying the law to the facts; and (6) reaching a conclusion 
(including an analysis of risks and unknowns).   
11 As indicated before, the relevant facts and legal issues feed back on one another, as does the results of the legal 
research.  These have to be revisited throughout the research process until the researcher is satisfied that all 
components necessary to pain as full a picture as possible have been identified and obtained. 
12 These five categories, but not the sub-categories, are taken directly from Ted Cook, Canadian Tax Research: A 
Practical Guide (Carswell: Toronto, 2010) at p 3.  As Cook points out, the dividing line between these categories of 
issues is not clear, and there will likely be overlap amongst the matters that fall into the categories.   
13 Tax Rules are the applicable provisions in statutes and regulations, including those in the Income Tax Act, RSC 
1985 c 1 (5th Supp); the Income Tax Application Rules, RSC 1985 c 2 (5th Supp); and Income Tax Regulations, 
CRC 1978 c 945.  For a more detailed listing of relevant legislative sources see http://ita-
annotated.ca/RecentDecisions/tax-research/sources-of-information/primary-sources/ .   
14 Legal issues are the interpretive issues that come up when trying to ascertain the meaning, scope, and application 
of the Tax Rules.  In order to interpret what the legislation requires, the researcher will need to look at and consider 
court cases and secondary sources (government documents, textbooks, articles, and so on).   
15 Calculation Issues refers to the formulas that the legislation provides when applying a particular Tax Rule, and the 
proper application of these formulas using the appropriate variables. 
16 Accounting Issues arise because accounting practice and principles are in the background of tax law and apply 
unless legislation requires a different approach.  The Chartered Professional Accountants (CPA) Canada Handbook 
is an authoritative guide for Canadian Accounting practice and principles.   
17 Factual Issues are the problems that arise when trying to establish or prove a legally relevant fact. 
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and interpretation issues.18  In short, this paper aims to allow the tax researcher to find the “law” 
– the pronouncements that have legal effect when solving tax law problems.19  
2. Finding the Law 
Income taxation has grown to be a very complicated area of law.  The ITA has ballooned 
from its eighteen (18) page origins20 to legislation and regulations that span several thousand 
pages.  This volume of material alone makes tax research challenging.21  In addition to the 
volume of material, income tax’s accessory-law nature (built and dependent on other common 
law principles and other statutes),22 its frequent amendments,23 and its purpose of reflecting 
compromised positions in relation to competing social, economic, monetary, and administrative 
values/needs complicate this area of law.24  Professor Vern Krishna observes that:25 
[t]he Income Tax Act continues to grow and we fully expect it to double in size 
and complexity during the next generation.  The statute is long – approximately 
2100 pages – badly drafted, and written in a style that would make our high 
school teachers of English cringe with embarrassment.  Notwithstanding the 
complexity of tax law, citizens must endure audits, which, like opera, the revenue 
authorities conduct in a language that few understand and that usually ends in 
tragedy. 
The role of a tax lawyer is to make the requirements of this opaque text understandable, 
and so ensure that play does not end in tragedy.  A saving grace is that as with any complicated 
                                                
18 To a smaller extent, the process will also allow the researcher to address (3) calculation issues by identifying the 
relevant formulas to apply and the manner of identifying the variables, and (5) factual issues by allowing the 
researcher to determine what types of facts are legally relevant.  
19 Not all pronouncements with legal effect are properly “law” in the positivist sense of the word “law”.  Some 
pronouncements have legal effect for all or some taxpayers, in Canada, though they are not legislation, regulations 
(or other subordinate legislation), or case law.  For a great paper discussing some of the issues around the definition 
of law see Scott J Shapiro, “The ‘Heart-Dworkin” Debate: A Short Guide for the Preplexed” (2 Feb 2007) 
University of Michigan Public Law Working Paper No 77, available online at http://ssrn.com/abstract=968657.   
More generally, see John Finnis, Philosophy of Law: Collected Essays, Volume IVi Oxford University Press: 
Oxford, 2011) available online at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1850674.  
20 Income War Tax Act, 1917, 7-8 George V c 28. 
21 For example, trying to determine whether an estate is a trust, and when it is or is not a trust, is not an easy task. 
For the solution see Sas Ansari, “Death and Taxes: The Nature of the Deceased’s ‘Estate’, its Relationship to the 
Deceased, and Practical Implications for Reassessments” available online at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2381553. 
22 For example, Justice Lyons of the TCC recently stated in Al-Hossain v The Queen, 2014 TCC 379, at para 23: 
It is well established in the jurisprudence that the court must look at the legal relationships that 
were entered into by private and contract law and tax consequences flow from those relationships. 
23 The ITA is frequently amended for a number of reasons.  Tone reasons is that the ITA is a tool for social and 
economic policy, and need to be revisited to respond to changing social and economic circumstances and demands.  
Another reason is that there is a constant back-and-forth between taxpayer’s who plan to minimize tax and the 
government that tries to raise revenues through taxation, leading to amendments to close ‘tax-loopholes” and correct 
technical oversights and deficiencies.  
24 The ITA contains not only revenue collection measures but also tax expenditure measures that are akin to 
budgetary expenditure measures that deliver benefits, aid, incentives, and subsidies to those persons or groups 
meeting relevant criteria.   
25 Vern Krishna, ”Preface”, in Fundamentals of Canadian Income Tax, 9th Ed (Thomson Carswell: Toronto, ON, 
2006). 
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system, the income tax system is built on foundational concepts and is animated by an inherent 
logic.26  The ITA is structured in a logical manner and the provisions are generally, though not 
obviously, organized.  By understanding these foundational concepts, grasping the animating 
logic, and deciphering the logic and organization of the ITA the researcher is better able to 
navigate the maze, and avoid feeling as Justice Learned Hand did when he wrote:27 
In my own case the words of such an act as the Income Tax ... merely dance 
before my eyes in a meaningless procession; cross-reference to cross-reference, 
exception upon exception – couched in abstract terms that offer no handle to seize 
hold of – leave in my mind only a confused sense of some vitally important, but 
successfully concealed, purport, which it is my duty to extract, but which is within 
my power, if at all, only after the most inordinate expenditure of time. I know that 
these monsters are the result of fabulous industry and ingenuity, plugging up this 
hole and casting out that net, against all possible evasion; yet at times I cannot 
help recalling a saying of William James about certain passages of Hegel; that 
they were no doubt written with a passion of rationality; but that one cannot help 
wondering whether to the reader they have any significance save that the words 
are strung together with syntactical correctness. 
Legal research is the process of finding cases, legislation, textbooks, articles, and other 
reference tools that help shine light on a particular legal question.  It also requires the researcher 
to verify that the “law” as found continues to be valid and applicable (has not been overruled, 
repealed, or significantly questioned or criticized).  In trying to determine what the applicable 
law is, a researcher will look at two general sources: (a) primary sources; and (b) secondary 
sources.  Primary sources are those sources that make up the law proper.  Secondary sources are 
those sources, including government documents and publications, that are potentially helpful in 
interpreting primary sources and developing arguments on the basis of primary sources.  Note 
that some government publications that are secondary sources,28 and therefore not strictly 
speaking “law”, may have legal effect in particular circumstances as determined by principles of 
Administrative Law.29   
Generally, legal research begins by looking at secondary sources of law so as to gain a 
general understanding of the law in a particular area, the regulatory authority’s position in 
relation to that area, the leading cases in that area, as well as related provisions or statutes that 
                                                
26 For example, understanding the theory and policy behind the definition of “income” will allow a researcher to 
know what items of receipts may give rise to tax consequences.  This paper will not attempt to explain the inherent 
logic and foundational principles that animate Canada’s income tax system.  This information is the subject to 
introductory tax courses, or can be obtained by reading tax textbooks (see for example David Duff, et al, Canadian 
Income Tax Law, 4th Edition (LexisNexis Canada: Toronto, ON, 2012)).  Rather, the paper aims to show the 
researcher where to look for the law or for items having legal effect. 
27 Learned Hand, “Thomas Walter Swan” (1947) 57 Yale L J 167 at 169. 
28 Some government publications have the force of law.  This happens when the legislation authorizes the 
government agency to produce such materials.  For example, the Corrections and Conditional Release Act, SC 1992 
c 20, at section 98, authorized the Commissioner of Corrections to issue directives.  These directives are similar to 
internal manuals produced by the CRA, but unlike those materials have the force of law because they are authorized 
by the statute. 
29 Discussed further below at 4.2 “Government Secondary Sources”. 
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apply to that area.  The researcher then turns to the primary sources to form his/her own opinion 
as to the applicability and effect of the law to the particular circumstances of the client.   
Next, Part 3 of the paper will examine the primary sources of Canadian tax law by 
considering legislative instruments, tax treaties, and the case law, as well as the principles that 
apply when reading, interpreting, and applying legislation and case law.  Then the paper will 
consider secondary sources of Canadian tax law and the use that can be made of these sources in 
Part 4, with a particular focus on government documents and publications.  Part 5 will bring 
these elements together and guide the researcher in developing an answer to the legal question.  
3. Primary Sources of Tax Law 
Primary sources are statements of the law itself that are formally/officially recognized as 
having the force of law within a jurisdiction.  It is the courts that ultimately determine what 
sources and statements have the force of law or have legal effect.30  In Canada, legislation 
(statutes and regulations), treaties that have been ratified and incorporated into Canadian law, 
and court decisions are primary sources of law. Any interpretation, opinion, or action of a 
researcher must ultimately rest on these sources.   
Tax law is principally statutory, meaning that the starting point and foundation will be 
legislation.  Double Tax Conventions (commonly called tax treaties) are, when ratified and 
incorporated into Canadian law,31 also primary sources on par with legislation.32 Case law 
primarily interprets the legislation and treaties, determining their application to various facts and 
circumstances.  However, the judicial decisions are also important because the common law 
(judge-made law) also forms part of the legal background against which the ITA operates.33 
3.1.Legislation 
3.1.1. Overview 
The starting point for Canadian income tax law is the Income Tax Act (“ITA”), which 
imposes the federal income tax.  Provincial legislation imposing income taxation generally 
works from, or builds on, the ITA.34  As mentioned earlier, income tax law is a accessory-law or 
                                                
30 Not all sources and statements that have legal effect are “law”.  This matter will be addressed in more detail 
below.  The reason a researcher must consider non-law sources that nevertheless have legal effect, is precisely 
because the outcome of a case is affected by all items that have legal effect.   
31 Because of Canada’s federalism structure, the power to negotiate and ratify treaties, including tax treaties, lies 
with the executive branch of the Federal Government (the Cabinet), but such treaties do not have legal force in 
Canada until they are incorporated into Canadian law by passing a Bill through the Legislative branch (Parliament).  
32 The ITA 
For an overview of Canada’s treaty making process see Treaty Practice and Procedure available online at 
http://www.treaty-accord.gc.ca/procedures.aspx.   
33 For example, the ITA provides an inclusive definition of “income” in section 3, but does not define what the term 
“income” means.  The definition of “income” comes from the common law.  Therefore, although the income tax is 
statutory, it cannot be understood without grasping the legal concepts that create the space within which the statute 
operates.   
34 Note that the constitutional power to tax is different at the federal level as compared to the provincial level.  The 
Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Victoria, c 3 (UK), at subsection 91(3) gives the federal government the power for 
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gloss on the law – it is something that is applied, unless the law provides otherwise, after all 
other laws have been applied to the circumstances giving rise to tax consequences.35  This means 
that, depending on the particular facts and circumstances, a researcher may have to look at 
provincial36 and other federal legislation37 (as well as the case law interpreting these other pieces 
of legislation), and sometimes the law of other countries,38 so as to get to the right solution.39   It 
is not always easy determining what jurisdictions and what laws a researcher needs to consider. 
Practice, experience, and diligent use of secondary sources (and seeking the guidance of senior 
practitioners) will pave a path towards eventual mastery.   
                                                                                                                                                       
“The raising of Money by any Mode of System of Taxation”, while subsection 92(2) grants the provinces the power 
to impose “Direct Taxation within the Province […]”.   
Each province and territory has a variety of taxing statutes that impose personal and corporate income taxes, retail 
sales taxes, property taxes, land transfer taxes, tobacco taxes, fuel taxes, and so on.  Sometimes, a term or phrase in 
the ITA may not have been interpreted or considered in a case dealing with the ITA, however it may have been 
interpreted in the context of a provincial taxing statute that uses the same word or phrase as the ITA.  Although such 
a decision would not be determinative for purposes of the ITA, the decision would be persuasive.   
Note that Quebec and Alberta administer their own income tax and their legislation is not as harmonized with the 
ITA as the legislation in other Provinces and Territories (though there is a great degree of similarity between those 
provincial statutes and the ITA).   
35 See for example the SCC decision in Will-Kare Paving & Contracting Ltd v Canada, [2000] 1 SCR 915, where 
the court stated that the ITA does not operate in a vacuum, and that legal characterization of the broader commercial 
relationships and law affect the operation and effect of the ITA.  In this case, the word “sale” has an established 
meaning in law, and its not open to the ITA to broaden that meaning to include the popular meaning of the word. 
See also the decision of the Federal Court in Crown Tire Service Ltd. v. The Queen,  [1984] 2 F.C. 219 (T.D.), where 
the common law and the provincial sale of goods laws were used to define the scope and meaning of the ITA 
provisions dealing with the manufacturing and processing incentives.  
36 Provincial legislation is available online at the various provincial or territorial government websites, or through 
the Canadian Legal Information Institute (CanLII) at http://canlii.org . 
One example where provincial law is important is in the example of Director Liability under the ITA or ETA, where 
the director must be assessed within 2 years of ceasing to be a director.  How and when a director of a corporation 
ceases to be a director is governed by the provincial corporate law where the particular corporation is provincially 
incorporated.   
37 Some other potentially relevant federal legislation includes: 
• Canada Business Corporations Act, RSC 1985 c C-44; 
• Indian Act, RSC 1985 c I-5; 
• Bank Act, SC 1991, C 46; 
• Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, RSC 1985, c B-2; 
• Foreign Missions and International Organizations Act, SC 1991, c 41; 
• Tax Court of Canada Act, RSC 1985 c T-2; 
• Pension Act, RSC 1985, c P-6; 
• Federal Courts Act, RSC 1985, c F-7; 
• Tax Rebate Discounting Act, RSC 1985, c T-3; 
• Visiting Forces Act, RSC 1985, c V-2; 
• Canada Disability Savings Act, SC 2007, c 35; 
• Canada Education Savings Act, SC 2004, c 26; 
• Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act, SC 1998, c 34; and 
• Various Budget Implementation Acts.   
38 For example, determining whether a foreign entity ‘owned’ by a Canadian resident corporation is a partnership or 
a corporation for Canadian tax purposes, and therefore the treatment of the income of that entity for Canadian tax 
purposes, depends on the legal character of that entity as determined by the law of the foreign jurisdiction.   
39 For example, to calculate Paid Up Capital of a corporation, a researcher will need to refer to the corporate statute 
under which the corporation in question has been organized or continued.   
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It would be impossible to list all of the other federal and provincial statutes (and 
regulations) that may be of importance in tax law research. However, there are some that come 
into play more often than others.  These other important pieces federal legislation include:40 
• Constitution Act, 1867;41 
• Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms;42 
• Income Tax Regulations;43 
• Income Tax Application Rules;44 
• Income Tax Conventions Interpretation Act;45 
• Interpretation Act;46 and 
• Remission Orders under the Financial Administration Act.47 
As stated above, general common-law concepts are also imported into the ITA.48 
Knowledge of other areas of law (including contract law, corporate law, property law, and so 
forth)49 is important so as to understand the meaning and effect of ITA provisions.50  The 
meaning of a word or phrase in tax law may depend on that word’s or phrase’s meaning in 
another area of law, or on the judicial interpretation of that word or phrase found in other 
                                                
40 To see a listing of, and the full text of, all federal statutes and regulations refers to the Department of Justice 
LAWS site at http://laws.justice.gc.ca/eng/.   
41 30 & 31 Victoria, C 3 (UK), sections 53-57, 91(3), and 92(2). 
42 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11. 
43 CRC 1978 c 945 (“ITR”).  The regulations provide additional detail that supplements the ITA’s more general 
provisions, or provides for things that the ITA states will be “prescribed”.   
44 RSC 1985 c 2 (5th Supp).  This legislation was enacted as part of the major income tax reforms undertaken in 
1971, and provided transitional rules between the old and the new system.  Some of these rules may still be relevant 
today (for example is a taxpayer continues to own property that they owned prior to 1972).   
45 RSC 1985, c I-4.  This legislation provides specific rules that apply to the interpretation and application of 
Canada’s tax treaties, and was introduced in response to the Supreme Court of Canada decision in R v Melford 
Developments Inc, [1982] 2 SCR 504, available online at http://canlii.ca/t/1z1cw.  
46 RSC 1985, c I-21.  This legislation governs the interpretation of all Federal statutes, providing both general rules 
of interpretation and definitions.   
47 RSC 1985, c F-11.  
48 The Federal Court of Appeal in Dale v. Canada, [1997] 3 FCR 235, at paragraph 13, stated:  
In determining whether a legal transaction will be recognized for tax purposes one must turn to 
the law as found in the jurisdiction in which the transaction is consummated.  Often that 
determination will be made without the aid of guiding precedents which are on point and, hence, 
the effectiveness of a transaction may depend solely on the proper application of general 
common law or equitable principles. In some instances it will be necessary for the Tax Court to 
interpret the statutory law of the province. As for the Minister, he must accept the legal results 
which flow from the proper application of common law and equitable principles, as well as the 
interpretation of legislative provisions 
49 For example, the ITA at subsection 104(1) provides a supplementary inclusive definition of a “trust” but the ITA 
itself does not define what a trust is; Fraser v The Queen, 91 DTC 5123 at page 5127 as affirmed 95 DTC 5685 
(FCA).  The researcher must turn to the common law of trusts and relevant provincial statutes, if any, to understand 
what a trust is.   
50 Where there is an international element, the researcher may also need to understand the law of other countries.  
For example, whether a foreign entity is a corporation or some other form of entity, for Canadian tax purposes, will 
depend on that foreign entity’s characteristics under foreign law. 
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statutes.51 This interaction with other areas of law makes tax law research particularly 
challenging.   
In addition to other legislation and the common law, tax treaties may also be relevant 
primary sources of law. Tax treaties are negotiated agreements between two nations. As such 
they are bilateral treaties.52  The agreement recorded in the tax treaty is meant to govern the 
relationship between the two countries with respect to the matters dealt with in the treaty.  Tax 
treaties, like other treaties, do not have the force of law in Canada unless they are incorporated 
into Canadian law through statute.53 Canadian tax convention acts, the acts incorporating tax 
treaties into Canadian law, generally state that the convention has the force of law in Canada, 
that in case of any inconsistency between the laws of Canada and the convention the provision of 
the convention govern, and that if there is any inconsistency between the convention and the 
Income Tax Conventions Interpretation Act54 the provisions of that act govern.  Although most 
modern treaties are based on the OECD Model Tax Treaty,55 each is individually negotiated and 
must be separately considered.56 
This portion of the paper will briefly review the ITA and ITR, and then provide guidance 
on how to read tax provisions found in them. Next, it will providing guidance on how to interpret 
tax statutes by reference to rules of statutory interpretation, before finishing with some brief 
guidance on the use, application, and interpretation of tax treaties.57 
3.1.2. The Income Tax Act 
The ITA is the primary source of Canadian income tax law – it is the foundation on 
which the Canadian income tax system is built.  If one is unfamiliar with the Canadian income 
tax system, a good secondary source can help identify the potential legal issues that are raised by 
particular facts, as well as identify potentially related provisions within the ITA or in other 
legislation, and point the researcher towards leading cases. However, once the researcher knows 
what the tax issues are, s/he should always start with the words of the ITA.  There really is no 
                                                
51 For example, the word “sale” has an established legal meaning, and this established meaning was imported into 
the ITA by the SCC in Will-Kare Paving & Contracting Ltd v Canada, 200 SCC 36.   
52 This is compared to a multi-lateral treaty which has more than two countries as signatories, with the effect that the 
relationship with respect to those subject matter’s covered are harmonized as among those countries.  
53 For example, Canada-Argentina Income Tax Convention Act, 1994, SC 1994, c 17; Canada-Armenia Income Tax 
Convention Act, 2004, SC 2005, c 8; or Canada-Colombia Tax Convention Act, 2010, SC 2010, c 15. 
54 RSC 1985, c I-4.   
55 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital 
(OECD: Paris, France, 2014), condensed version available online at http://www.keepeek.com/Digital-Asset-
Management/oecd/taxation/model-tax-convention-on-income-and-on-capital-condensed-version-2014_mtc_cond-
2014-en#page1.  
56 The other common model convention is provided by the United Nations.  This convention is more favourable 
towards source jurisdiction taxation, and therefore more favourable to developing and capital-exporting countries.  
For a full text copy of the United Nations Model Double Tax Convention between developed and developing 
Countries, see http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/publications/double-taxation-convention.html.   
For a comparison between the OECD Model Convention and the UN Model Convention see Michal Leannard, “The 
UN Model Tax Convention as Compared with the OECD Model Tax Convention – Current Points of Difference and 
Recent Developments” (January/February 2009) Asia-Pacific Tax Bulletin 4, available online at 
http://www.taxjustice.net/cms/upload/pdf/Lennard_0902_UN_Vs_OECD.pdf.   
57 A detailed description of the interpretation and application of tax treaties is beyond the scope of this paper.   
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substitute for reading the relevant provisions, in their entirety, with one’s issues and objectives in 
mind.58    
Reading ITA provisions is not easy task.  Practice, perseverance, and persistence are required to 
become an adept reader of the ITA.  In addition to needing to have a solid grasp of the principles 
of statutory interpretation,59 in order to understand the often complex provisions of the ITA, the 
researcher must be aware that: 
• there are many defined terms and phrases, either for the purpose of the Act or for limited 
purposes;60 
• provisions may contain cross references and exceptions, making it important understand 
how the various provisions work together; 
• the operation of one provision may be affected by other, related, provisions; 
• there are certain word-patterns that determine the application of formulas;61 
• one has to keep in mind the need to consider pending amendments, effective dates, and 
in-force dates; 
• amendments are often retroactive (and sometime retrospective), making it important 
to look and see what date an amendment is in effective from;62 and 
• tax issues arise at a particular date and time, and the legislation at that time is the one that 
will govern (unless future amendments are retroactive).63 
Given the length of the ITA, knowing how the legislation is structured will allow a 
researcher to know where to look for potentially relevant provisions.  The structure of the ITA 
follows (mostly) a logical pattern, and is divided into Parts.  Part I of the ITA, comprising 
sections 2 through 180, is the only part that deals with the true Income Tax and is the only part 
that is further divided into Divisions and subdivisions. The other parts impose distinct taxes in 
                                                
58 Professor Krishna states that “one must read each provision carefully — at least three times — methodically, and 
in the context of evolving judicial doctrines of statutory interpretation.” Vern Krishna, ”Preface”, in Fundamentals 
of Canadian Income Tax, 9th Ed (Thomson Carswell: Toronto, ON, 2006). 
59 These are discussed at 3.1.5 “Interpreting Tax Legislation”, below.   
60 Defined terms are often found in subsection 248(1), although definitions may be found anywhere in the ITA (at 
the beginning or end of Divisions, subdivisions, or provisions.  The scope and application of these definitions is 
determined by the opening words of the definition, and not by the location within the ITA where they are located.   
61 The common word patterns found in the ITA are: 
• The total of A and B; 
• The lesser of A and B; 
• The greater of A and B; 
• The proportion of A that B is of C; 
• The amount by which A exceeds B+C; and 
• A and B versus A or B. 
The description of the variables used in formulas are provided by the provision or a related provision.  Note that 
unless otherwise provided, where the result of the application of a formula is a negative value, the ITA deems that 
value to be Nil by operation of ITA section 257.   
62 For an excellent article dealing with retroactivity in income tax law, see Thomas McDonnell, QC, “Retroactivity: 
Policy and Practice” (26 Nov 2006) Proceedings of the Fifty-Eighth Annual Tax Conference (Canadian Tax 
Foundation: Toronto, ON, 2007). 
63 This means that depending on when the tax issue arose, the researcher may have to do historical research and 
reconstruct the ITA and other applicable legislation.  Such reconstruction is not required for case law, as the case 
law at the time the dispute is being litigated is what governs.   
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particular circumstance.64  A number of parts apply to the ITA as a whole.  These general parts 
have to be kept in mind whenever one is dealing with provisions in any particular portion.65 
General Parts include: Part XV, which deals with Administration and Enforcement of the ITA; 
Part XVI which deals with Tax Avoidance; and Part XVII which deals with Interpretation of the 
ITA.   
Alternatively, rather than consider the Parts of the ITA, we can look at the ITA in a 
functional manner.  Groups of sections could be seen as performing specific functions within the 
larger scheme of the ITA.  For example, liability to tax and computation of income is dealt with 
by sections 2 to 4, while business and property income is dealt with in sections 9 to 37.   The 
author prefers the grouping used by CCH Canadian,66 and reproduced here in Appendix 1.  
Whatever a researcher’s preference, having a list of the ITA’s structure will allow him/her to 
start looking for relevant provisions.67 
3.1.3. The Income Tax Regulations  
The ITA, although more detailed than most other legislation, is still relatively general in 
application.  The Income Tax Regulations,68 authorized by the ITA69 and having the force of law, 
provide necessary detail and guidance.70   
One common area where the ITR comes into play is where the ITA prescribed 
something.71  Whenever the ITA uses the term “prescribed” (or a derivative of this), it means that 
the additional detail is to be found in the ITR.72   For example, paragraphs 18(1)(b) of the ITA 
generally denies deductions on capital account, while Paragraphs 20(1)(a) permits a deduction 
for  such a portion of a capital expenditures for business or property income as is allowed by the 
ITRs.  The researcher will need to look to Part XI of the ITRs dealing with Capital Cost 
Allowances so as to determine whether, and to what extent, a capital expenditure is deductible.   
The ITR is structured using parts (numbered using roman numerals), with the section 
number of the regulations being a multiple of 100 times the part number of the ITR.  The ITRs 
also contain a number of schedules, the contents of which must be kept in mind.  In total there 
                                                
64 For example. Part II imposes a Tobacco Manufacturers’ Surtax, Part IV Imposes a Tax on Dividends Received by 
Private Corporations; and Part VII deals with Refundable Tax on Corporations Issuing Qualifying Shares.   
65 There are four parts that apply to the ITA as a whole, and they are: Part XV (Administration and Enforcement); 
Part XVI (Tax Avoidance); Part XVI.1 (Transfer Pricing); and Part XVII (Interpretation).   
66 Canadian Income Tax Act with Regulations, Annotated, 98th Ed (Autumn 2014) (CCH Canadian: Toronto, On, 
2014).  
67 For a listing of the general structure of the ITA see http://ita-annotated.ca/RecentDecisions/tax-research/know-
thy-ita/the-structure-of-the-ita/. 
68 CRC 1978 c 945 (“ITR”). 
69 ITA, supra note 2 at section 221, which sets out a list of matters in regard to which the Governor in Council may 
make regulations.   
70 Another reason why something maybe found in the ITR rather than the ITA is that it is a matter that is subject to 
frequent change.  Amending regulations is relatively easy through an Order in Council, and allows government to 
modify details of legislation without having to go through the whole legislative process. 
71 For example, paragraph 6(1)(k) of the ITA refers to an “amount prescribed” for purposes of calculating an 
automobile operating expense benefit.  This prescribed amount is found in ITR 7305.1.   
72 For example, capital cost allowance (CCA) rates and rules are found in ITR s 1100.  However, just because the 
ITA refers to something being prescribed does not necessarily mean that the relevant regulation exists.   
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are 95 parts, comprising over 400 sections, and 10 schedules in the ITR.73 It is helpful to keep a 
table of contents for the ITR handy so that you can quickly determine whether you may have to 
look at particular Parts of the ITR in more detail.  
Finally, the authority to make regulations, granted in the ITA, is broad and contains rules 
that override the general principle that regulations are effective from the date of registration.74  
Just as with ITA amendments, amendments and additions to the ITR to be outstanding through 
they will operate (when effective) from the date of announcement (or some other date expressly 
provided).  A researcher will therefore need to be aware of pending amendments as well as 
effective dates of amendments to the ITR. 
3.1.4. How to Read Income Tax Provisions 
The provisions of the ITA are often long and convoluted.  However, given that the ITA 
should always be the foundation and starting point when forming an opinion as to the law, a 
researcher must know how to read and understand the ITA’s provisions.  Although secondary 
sources and annotated acts can help a researcher understand what provisions may be relevant, the 
researcher must understand how the law affects a client’s circumstances independent from the 
opinions expressed in these other sources.   
What follows is meant to provide the researcher the tools with which to give meaning to 
the words, phrases, and sentences in ITA provisions, and thereby form an opinion as to the law.  
The first step in understanding a provision is breaking it down into its operative components 
(words and/or phrases).  This step requires one to exercise judgment and break the provision into 
‘single-issue’ portions.75  For example, let us look at subsection 18(2.3):76 
18(2.3) Notwithstanding subsection 18(2.2), if all of the corporations that are 
associated with each other in a taxation year have filed with the Minister in 
prescribed form an agreement whereby, for the purposes of this section, they 
allocate an amount to one or more of them for the taxation year and the amount so 
allocated or the total of the amounts so allocated, as the case may be, does not 
exceed $1,000,000, the base level deduction for the year for each of the 
                                                
73 As at January 13, 2015.   
74 Income Tax Act, RSC 1985, c 1 (5th Supp) at subsection 221(2), where it states that: 
A regulation made under this Act shall have effect from the date it is published in the Canada 
Gazette or at such time thereafter as may be specified in the regulation unless the regulation 
provides otherwise and it [meet the below conditions]. 
75 The phrase “single-issue portion” is used to refer to operative components of a provision that can either be 
attacked or defended in order to succeed.  For example, in the example using subsection 18(2.3),  the third bullet 
identified the word “all”, meaning that is only some but not all of whatever is referred to are involved, the provision 
would not apply. 
76 The provisions of the ITA are numbered by sections, and each section may be further divided into subsections, 
paragraphs, subparagraphs, clauses, and subclauses.  The numbering of these further divisions is consistent: 
• The first number refers to the section number; 
• The second number, in brackets, refers to the subsection; 
• The lower case letter, in brackets, refers to the paragraph; 
• The lower case roman numerals, in brackets, refer to the subparagraph; 
• The upper case letter, in brackets, refers to the clause; and 
• The upper case roman numerals, in brackets, refers to the subclause;  
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corporations is the base level deduction that would be computed under subsection 
18(2.2) in respect of the corporation if the reference in that subsection to 
$1,000,000 were read as a reference to the amount so allocated to it. 
In breaking up the preceding subsection into single-issue portions, the result would be: 
§ Notwithstanding subsection 18(2.2) 
• IF  
• all  
• of the corporations  
• that are associated with each other 
• in a taxation year 
• have filed with the Minister  
• in prescribed form an agreement whereby 
• for purposes of this section 
• they allocate an amount to one or more of them 
• for the taxation year 
•  AND the amounts so allocated OR the total of the amounts so allocated, as the case may 
be, 
• does NOT exceed $1,000,000 
• [THEN]  
• the base level deduction for the year 
• for each of the corporations 
• is the base level deduction that would be computed under subsection 18(2.2) in respect to 
the corporation 
• IF the reference in that subsection to $1,000,000 were read as a reference to the amount 
so allocated to it. 
Notice that CAPS are used to indicate words that indicate conditions, limitations, 
conjunctions, disjunctions, and results – IF; AND; OR; NOT.  This is done to make these 
important words stand out.  Also notice that words have been added in CAPS and [] when 
needed to make sense of the provision.  Broken up in this way, each part of the bulleted portions 
is one question that may or may not affect the application of the rule and could be formed into 
self-monitoring questions.  An example of a self-monitoring question based on the above 
example, is: Which corporations are associated with each other?   
Another way to break down an income tax provision is to identify operational 
components of a provision.  Operational components are closely related to the components of 
technical tax provisions, and generally are:77 
• Persons affected: this identifies the person or persons affected by the provision under 
examination; 
                                                
77 Note that each of these components must be present. However, the components may not be found all in one 
provision, and may be scattered throughout the ITA.   
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• Receipts Contemplated: this identifies the amounts, transactions, or exchanges of 
property that are relevant; 
• Circumstances contemplated: this identifies the conditions or facts that must be present 
for the provision to apply; 
• Limitations: this identifies the extent of application or exceptions to application of a 
provision; 
• Relevant Period: this identifies the time period(s) that are converged by the provision; 
and 
• Consequences: this identifies the effect of having the provision apply. 
After the researcher has broken the provision into its potentially operating potions, s/he 
can cull out the portions that do not apply to the particular circumstances under consideration.  
This will allow him/her to focous on the relevant issues, and not waste time on irrelevant matters.   
3.1.5. Interpreting Tax Legislation78  
The provisions of the ITA (and other tax legislation) must be interpreted so as to apply to 
specific facts and circumstances.  The courts have developed, and will apply, rules of statutory 
interpretation to determine the meaning of tax provisions.  Understanding these rules will allow a 
tax researcher to form a reasonable opinion, and alternatives, as to how a court may interpret and 
apply the law in any particular case.  Before we start, the researcher should keep the words of 
Oliver Wendell Holmes in mind when attempting to assign meaning any synthetically correct 
string of words:79 
A word is not a crystal; transparent and unchanged, it is the skin of a living 
thought and may vary in colour and content according with the circumstances and 
the time in which it is used.  
Statutory interpretation of fiscal legislation, including tax legislation, has evolved over 
time.  When income taxation was still young,80 taxation was seen as confiscation of property and 
strictly interpreted to limit the legislation’s reach.81  However, the misconception that taxes are 
                                                
78 For two good, but now somewhat dates articles see David G Duff, “Interpreting The Income Tax Act – Part 1, 
Interpretive Doctrines” (1999), 47:3 Canadian Tax Journal 464; and David G Duff, “Interpreting the Income Tax 
Act – Part 2: Toward a Pragmatic Approach” (1999) 47:4 Canadian Tax Journal 741.   
79 Towne v Eisner, 245 US 418 at 425.  
80 Canada’s first income taxing statute is generally stated to be the Income War Tax Act, 1917, 7-8 George V c 28.  
However, in order to fund WWI Canada started taxing business profits through An Act to supplement the Revenue 
required to meet War Expenditures, (1915) 5 Geo V c 8, and An Act to levy a tax on Business Profits, (1916) 6-7 
Geo V c 11.  These statutes imposed limited income taxation.  The 1917 Act was the first general income tax. 
The need to fund the war effort is traditionally provided as being the reason for the introduction of the general 
income tax in Canada.  However, the Parliamentary debated reveal that the Business Profits Tax of 1916, combined 
with the excises and duties, though with increased rates, would have been able to fund the war effort, but the income 
tax was introduced in part to spread the tax burden among all taxpayers (not just businesses) and to turn it into a tax 
that could last well into the future. See House of Commons Debates, Parliament of Canada, 12th parliament 7th 
session 1917, pages 3761-62. 
81 See the dictum of Lord Cains in Partington v AG (1986), LE 4 HL 100 (HL) at 122, where it was said: 
[…]as I understand the principle of all fiscal legislation, it is this: if the person sought to be taxed 
comes within the letter of the law he must be taxed, however great the hardship may appear to the 
judicial mind to be. On the other hand, if the Crown, seeking to recover the tax, cannot bring the 
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impositions, burdens, restrictions of freedoms, usurpations of individual choice, or interference 
with private property have slowly been replaced with a better understanding of the role of 
taxation in a modern, market-based, welfare state.82  Contemporary courts resort to the “modern 
rule” of statutory interpretation when interpreting legislation, including the ITA. 
3.1.5.1. The Modern Rule of Statutory Interpretation 
The modern rule for interpreting tax legislation mirrors the general rule for interpreting 
legislation generally.83  The modern rule is: 
[…] the words of an Act are to be read in their entire context and in their 
grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the 
object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament.84 
This is often called the ‘textual, contextual, purposive’ approach to statutory 
interpretation.  Though easily stated, the operation of this rule of interpretation is often very 
complex.  What is meant by Text? Context? Purpose? How are these various factors to be 
weighed and when?  Courts have tried to provide guidance as to the application of the modern 
rule to tax legislation, and large textbooks have been written on the topic of statutory 
interpretation.85  However, it has been argued that the SCC’s guidance on the application of the 
                                                                                                                                                       
subject within the letter of the law, the subject is free, however apparently within the spirit of the 
law the case might otherwise appear to be. 
Other, non-modern rules, included: (i) plain meaning approach, (ii) purposive approach, and (iii) pragmatic, 
consequentialist approach. 
The change in the nature of taxing statutes was recognized in Stubart Investment Ltd v Canada, [1985] 1 SCR 536, 
where the court said: 
Income tax legislation, such as the federal Act in our country, is no longer a simple device to raise 
revenue to meet the cost of governing the community. Income taxation is also employed by 
government to attain select economic policy objectives. 
82 See for example Robert Stevens, Law and Politics: The House of Lords as a Judicial Body, 1800-1976 
(University of North Carolina Press: Chapel Hill, 1978) where at pages 170-71 the author refers to decisions being 
influenced by the perception that taxation was the confiscation of property.   
83 Stubart Investments v The Queen, [1984] 1 SCR 536, available online at http://canlii.ca/t/1lpfb. The Supreme 
Court of Canada adopted the approach put forth in E A Driedger, Construction of Statutes, 2d ed (Butterworths: 
Toronto, ON, 1983) at p 87.  In the third edition of Driedger on the Construction of Statutes, 3rd ed (Butterworhts: 
Toronto, 1994) at 132, the rule is expressed in these words: 
There is only one rule in modern interpretation, namely, courts are obliged to determine the 
meaning of legislation in its total context, having regard to the purpose of the legislation, the 
consequences of proposed interpretations, the presumptions and special rules of interpretation, as 
well as admissible external aids. In other words, the courts must consider and take into account all 
relevant and admissible indicators of legislative meaning. After taking these into account, the 
court must then adopt an interpretation that is appropriate. An appropriate interpretation is one that 
can be justified in terms of (a) its plausibility, that is, its compliance with the legislative text; (b) 
its efficacy, that is, its promotion of the legislative purpose; and (c) its acceptability, that is, the 
outcome is reasonable and just. 
84 E A Driedger, Construction of Statutes, 2d Ed (Butterworths: Toronto, ON, 1983) at p 87, cited in Stubart, supra 
note 82 at 6323. 
85 The leading book on statutory interpretation is Ruth Sullivan, Sullivan on the Construction of Statutes, 6th Edition 
(LexisNexis: Toronto, ON, 2014).   
For papers dealing expressly with the interpretation of tax statutes, see: Jinyan Li and David Piccolo, “Reviving the 
Modern Rule in the Interpretation of Tax Statutes: Baby Steps Taken in Canada Trustco, Mathew, Place Dome and 
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modern rule to tax legislation is inadequate, leaving many important questions unanswered.86  
This paper is providing only a brief overview of the rules of statutory interpretation.   
In addition to the modern rule, it is important to remember that both the French and 
English versions of federal legislation are equally authoritative,87 and that federal legislation 
must be interpreted in light of the Interpretation Act,88 section 12, directive that “[e]very 
enactment is deemed remedial, and shall be given such fair, large and liberal construction and 
interpretation as best ensures the attainment of its objects”.89 The modern rule is not easy to 
apply, and various factors need to be taken into account.  These factors are often found in the 
various, older, approaches to and rules of statutory interpretation. These older rules are discussed 
at the end of this portion of the paper (at 3.1.5.3).  
A brief outline of the history of the SCC’s flirtation with the modern rule in the tax 
context seems appropriate.  The modern rule was first expressly adopted by the SCC in Stubart,90 
where it was said that tax statutes are to be interpreted in the same manner as other statutes.  The 
Stubart decision was followed in Bronfman,91 where the Court rejected a taxpayer’s argument on 
the basis of Parliament’s intention when enacting the provisions in question.  Despite this strong 
start and the continued reference to the modern rule, the SCC reduces the effect of the modern 
rule by taking what is known as the “plain meaning” approach.  The move away began with the 
decision in Antosko,92 where the Court held that a taxpayer was entitled to rely on the “clear and 
plain” meaning of the statute when they applied to the taxpayer’s circumstances absent the object 
and purpose of the provision.93  The plain meaning approach was also followed in Friesen,94 
where the Court said that object and purpose only become relevant when the text of provision 
“admits of some doubt or ambiguity” – essentially equating the modern rule with the older plain 
meaning rule.95  The SCC appeared to be set on this two part application of the modern rule 
when interpreting tax legislation and again applied it in Ludco.96   
The first GAAR case to come before the SCC appears to have given life again to the 
modern rule proper.  In Canada Trustco,97 the SCC reaffirmed the modern rule’s application and 
said that the “interpretation of a statutory provision must be made according to a textual, 
                                                                                                                                                       
Imperial Oil” (2007) 3:6 CLPE Research Paper 31/2007; Brian Arnold, “The Supreme Court and the Interpretation 
of Tax Statutes – Again” (2006) 54 Canadian Tax Journal 677; and David G Duff, “Justice Iacobucci and the 
‘Golden an Straight Metwand” of Canadian Tax Law” (2007) 57 University of Toronto Law Journal 525. 
86 Jinyan Li and David Piccolo, “Reviving the Modern Rule in the Interpretation of Tax Statutes: Baby Steps Taken 
in Canada Trustco, Mathew, Place Dome and Imperial Oil” (2007) 3:6 CLPE Research Paper 31/2007.  
87 Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Schedule B, Canada Act, 1982, subsection 18(1), and Official Languages Act, 
SC 1985, c 31 (4th Supp), sections 6, 7, and 13.  Courts will attempt to find an interpretation that is in line with both 
versions.  
88 Interpretation Act, RSC 1985 c -21. 
89 Another important rule of interpretation provided in the Interpretation Act, is that words and phrases that are 
defined in a statute have the same meaning in the regulations authorized by that statute. 
90 Stubart Investment Ltd v Canada, [1984] 1 SCR 536 (“Stubart”).   
91 Bronfman Trust v The Queen, [1987] 1 SCR 32 (“Bronfman”).   
92 Canada v Antosko, [1994] 2 SCR 312 (“Antosko).   
93 Ibid, at para 25.   
94 Friesen v Canada, [1995] 3 SCR 103 (“Friesen”). 
95 Ibid, at para 60.   
96 Ludco Enterprises Ltd v Canada, 2001 SCC 62 (“Ludco”) 
97 Canada Trustco Mortgage Co v Canada, 2005 SCC 54 (“Canada Trustco”). 
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contextual and purposive analysis to find a meaning that is harmonious with the Act as a 
whole”.98  The court recognized that the relative weight to be given to each of the three elements 
may vary depending to the extent and level of ambiguity in the provision being interpreted.  
Where the words are” precise and unequivocal, the ordinary meaning of the words play a 
dominant role”,99 but “where the words can support more than one reasonable meaning, the 
ordinary meaning of the words plays a lesser role”.100  The difference between this version of the 
modern rule and the plain meaning approach to the modern rule is the emphasis of applying all 
three criteria at all times, as “in all cases the court must seek to read the provision of an Act as a 
harmonious whole”.101  That said, the Court emphasized that because of the explicit detailed 
provisions dominating the ITA, and its role in economic and business planning, provisions must 
be interpreted so as to “achieve consistency, predictability, and fairness so that taxpayers may 
manage their affairs intelligently”.102  In Canada Trustco the court is ambivalent in the robust 
application of the modern rule to ‘usual’ ITA provisions while being clear that the robust 
analysis applies to GAAR.  In Mathew,103 another GAAR case, the court determine the meaning 
of two provisions used in concert by the taxpayer to in effect sell losses by applying a robust 
modern rule.  The Court recognize that it may be “useful to consider the three elements of 
statutory interpretation separately to ensure that each has received its due, [the Court expressly 
stated that these elements] inevitably intertwine”.104  Note that in Mathew the court truly 
intertwined all three elements, and even under the textual element purposive interpretation was 
use to ensure that the interpretation of one provision considered related provisions.105 
Placer Dome106 took the modern rule squarely beyond the GAAR provisions and into the 
realm usual ITA provisions and provisions of provincial taxing statutes.  However, the SCC in 
Placer Dome appears to have retreated towards textual pain meaning preference for taxing 
statutes when it stated that where “a provision admits to no ambiguity in its meaning or in its 
application to the facts, it must simply be applied”.107  That said, the Court, after fining 
ambiguity, looked to the entire statute and used presumed legislative purpose drawn from the 
presumption against tautology and against absurdity.  The SCC now always cites the modern rule 
as applicable in tax cases,108 but its application can sometimes leave the researcher confused as 
to the relative weight to be given to each of the three elements.109  The different interpretations 
                                                
98 Ibid, at para 10.   
99 Ibid, at para 10.   
100 Ibid, at para 10.   
101 Ibid, at para 10.   
102 Ibid, at para 12.   
103 Mathew v Canada, 2005 SCC 55 (“Mathew”).   
104 Ibid, at para 43.   
105 Ibid, at 46.   
106 Placer Dome Canada Ltd. v. Ontario (Minister of Finance), 2006 SCC 20 (“Placer Dome”).   
107 Ibid, at para 23.   
108 See for example A.Y.S.A. Amateur Youth Soccer Association v. Canada (Revenue Agency), 2007 SCC 42; Lipson 
v Canada, 2009 SCC 1; Copthorne Holdings Ltd v Canada, 2011 SCC 63; Dube v Canada, 2011 SCC 39; Bastien 
Estate v Canada, 2011 SCC 38; and Canada v Craig, 2012 SCC 43.   
109 For example, the SCC in Imperial Oil Ltd v Canada, 2006 SCC 46, the SCC agreed on the application of the 
modern rule but the court split as to relative weight to be given to the elements, with the dissent strongly emphasizes 
the textual element and described the tax rules as “rules of engagement” that apply to the “battlefield on which over 
21 million Canadian taxpayers engage with the Minister”.  The dissents comments belie a misunderstanding of the 
role of taxation in modern Canadian society.  
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and weights given to the three elements by the dissent and majority in Imperial Oil, for example, 
demonstrate the difficulty of applying the modern rule.110 
Where does this leave the researcher? We know that text, context, and purpose must be 
taken into account in all interpretative exercises, and that the goal is to use these three elements 
so as to arrive at an interpretation that is harmonious with the entire scheme of the ITA.  We also 
know that the three elements are intertwined such that each element may have an influence on 
the application of the other two.  In this paper, the following suggestions are made when looking 
at text, context, and purpose as part of an interpretive exercise.111  
The textual element requires the reader to form an opinion as to the ordinary meaning of 
the words used in the relevant provision(s).  This ordinary meaning is often the first impression 
formed when the text is read through.112  However, the ordinary meaning is not the dictionary 
meaning of words or even the common meaning of words.  The ordinary meaning of words is 
informed by the context, including the subject matter being addressed, such that the ordinary 
meaning can be either the dictionary meaning,113 the common meaning,114 the legal meaning,115 
or the technical meaning.116  Which one of these meanings, or what combination of them, inform 
the “ordinary meaning” of an ITA provision will depend on the context of the provision.  The 
textual element will be given greater weight where: 
• The provision is drafted in great detail, and the words used are concrete and 
precise;117 
• The provision is directed at a specialized subgroup of the public; and  
• Where the importance of certainty and predictability are of paramount and legitimate 
concern.  
The contextual element has a number of facets.  The interpretive context includes:  
                                                
110 For a thorough analysis of the differences between the dissent and the majority when applying the modern rule 
see Jinyan Li and David Piccolo, “Reviving the Modern Rule in the Interpretation of Tax Statutes: Baby Steps 
Taken in Canada Trustco, Mathew, Place Dome and Imperial Oil” (2007) 3:6 CLPE Research Paper 31/2007, at pp 
34-40.   
111 This approach is generally supported by the comments of Ruth Sullivan in her leading book Sullivan on the 
Construction of Statutes, 6th Edition (LexisNexis: Toronto, ON, 2014).   
112 Canadian Pacific Air Lines Ltd v Canadian Air line Pilots Association, [1993] 2 SCR 724 at 735. 
113 A dictionary provides an acontextual range of senses in which a word is used in a particular linguistic community 
(British, Canadian, American, etc).   
114 The common meaning refers to the meaning assigned by a reader based on that reader’s personal context.  This is 
at best a hypothetical meaning that does not consider the other senses of the word that may arise from other contexts. 
For example, a woodworker will assign a different meaning to the word “property” than would a property lawyer, 
and a property lawyer would assign a different meaning to the word “property” than would  a tax lawyer. 
115 Some words have been defined in jurisprudence to have particular meaning or are defined by related and relevant 
statutes to have specific meanings.   
116 Certain words have particular meanings when used in the context of particular professions, activities, or 
communities.  For example the word “car” would have a different meaning when used in the construction 
community (meaning a piece of heavy equipment) than in the veterinarian community (a feline and common pet). 
117 In Canada Trustco, supra note 97, at para 11, the SCC stated that the “particularity and detail of many tax 
provisions have often lead to an emphasis on textual interpretation”, and as such, “where Parliament has specified 
precisely what conditions must be satisfied to achieve a particular result, it is reasonable to assume that Parliament 
intended that taxpayer would rely on such provisions to archive the results they prescribe”.   
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• The internal or literary context, which is made up of the text and grammatical 
structure of the provision, and moves out to include related provisions, the placement 
of the provision within the lager structure of the legislation, the relationship of the 
provision to all of the provisions in the statute, the and the entire statute book; 
• The legal context, which includes the legislative history of the provision(s) being 
interpreted, the existing case law in relation to the words and phrases used in the 
provision, the common law background against which the provision operates, related 
statutes, the constitution, international treaties, and international law;118 and  
• The external context, which includes the reasons for the statute or provisions 
existence (social, economic, and/or political), the historical circumstances 
surrounding the enactment or amendment(s), the social setting in which the statute is 
meant to operate, the social institutions through which the statute achieves its 
objectives, and malice or need that the statute or provision is meant to respond to, and 
the general cultural context of the jurisdiction in which the statute operates. 
Each of these facets must be considered, be the relative weight given to each facet will 
differ on the circumstances of the interpretive exercise.  Larger contextual lenses will gain 
greater prominence when interpreting the provision(s) the wider and more general the provision 
is in its operation and intended target audience, and the less detailed and technical the provision 
is.  However, the relevance and weight of each of the various contextual lenses, and their 
appropriate mix, appears to depend on subjective assessments of factors that may make each 
context relevant and meaningful or not. 
The final factor requires the researcher to ponder where statutory purpose/intention 
comes from and how it is identified?  The reasoning for this analysis comes from the 
presumption that all statutes and provisions within them have a purpose.119  The court’s duty is to 
discover the purpose.  In Canada Trustco, the SCC considered:120  
                                                
118 In Manrell v Canada, 2003 FCA 128, at para 28 and 48, the Federal Court of Appeal included the legislative 
history of the provision and the case law interpreting words used in the provision as part of the legal context. 
119 The historical roots of referring to purpose in interpreting statutes lies in Heydon’s Case (1584) 76 ER 637, 
which set out the mischief rule, and stated at 638: 
For the sure and true interpretation of all statutes in general (be they penal or beneficial, restrictive 
or enlarging of the common law) four things are to be discerned and considered: 
1 st. What was the common law before the making of the Act. 
2 nd. What was the mischief and defect for which the common law did not provide. 
3 rd. What remedy the Parliament hath resolved and appointed to cure the disease of the 
commonwealth. 
And 4 th. The true reason of the remedy; and then the office of all the Judges is always to make 
sure construction as shall suppress the mischief, and advance the remedy, and to suppress subtle 
inventions and evasions for continuance of the mischief, and pro privato commodo, and to add 
force and life to the cure and remedy, according to the true intent of the makers of the Act, pro 
bono publico. 
120 Canada Trustco, supra note 97 at paras 74-75.  This was also done in Mathew, supra note 103 at paras 48-54, 
with a particular focous on the general policy of the ITA towards transfer of losses between arm’s length taxpayers.   
Page 20 
• The express, clear and plain purpose/intention on the basis of the enacted words in 
the provision;121 
• The implicit purpose/intention derived from the ITA’s broader treatment of specific 
kinds of circumstances, the relationship between the provision and related provisions, 
and the legislative history of the provision that are reasonably implied on the basis of 
the enacted words;122 
• The presumed purpose/intention123 assigned to legislative actions absent an 
indication to the contrary, for example that of promoting certainty and predictability 
in financial and tax matters;124 and  
• The express stated purpose/intention by the legislature as identified through 
records of legislative debate, technical notes accompanying introduction and changes 
in legislation, government reports, and the like. 
It appears from Mathew that when two or more provisions have to be interpreted because 
their interaction is giving rise to the tax controversy before the court, then the combined purposes 
of the various provisions must be considered.125  Where the purpose/intention behind the statute 
or provision is sufficiently clear, such an identified purpose may be given significant weight 
even in circumstances where the text appears to have a clear and unambiguous meaning in odds 
with that purpose.  Note that a provision or statute may be informed by a mix of purposes, and 
the appropriate mix and balance between the components must be struck as part of the 
interpretive exercise.   
                                                
121 The ordinary meaning is not itself a dictionary meaning, but is the contextual ordinary meaning.  For example, in 
Placer Dome, supra note 106,  the SCC determined the ordinary meaning of “hedging” by referring to Generally 
Accepted Accounting Principles and Canadian court decisions. 
122 See Mathew, supra note 103 at para 51.  However, the SCC in A.Y.S.A. Amateur Youth Soccer Association v. 
Canada (Revenue Agency), 2007 SCC 42, at paragraph 15, noted that although implied purpose is part of the modern 
rule, “arguments based on implied purpose must be viewed with caution”.  This was based on the statement of the 
SCC in Shell Canada Ltd v Canada, [1999[ 3 SCR 622 at para 43, where the court noted that the ITA “is a complex 
statute through which Parliament seeks to balance a myriad of principles.  This Court has consistently held that 
courts must therefore be cautious before finding within the clear provisions of the Act an unexpressed legislative 
intention.” 
This can include the relationship between the common law and the ITA provisions, supported by Hansard.  The 
majority of the SCC in A.Y.S.A. Amateur Youth Soccer Association v. Canada (Revenue Agency), 2007 SCC 42, at 
paragraph 12 rejected the government’s argument that the ITA provision occupied the filed and provided a complete 
code for sports associations and stated that Parliament intended to leave non-expressly mentioned sports 
associations’ eligibility for charitable status to be determined according to the common law of charity.  The SCC 
differentiated between parliament ‘extending’ the common law definition of charity and using an alternative 
mechanism to achieve its social purpose.   
123 The presumed purpose also includes several rules of statutory interpretation that result from conventions of 
statutory drafting, including the presumption against unconstitutionality and the presumption against tautology.  The 
presumption against tautology was used by the SCC in Placer Dome, supra note 106, at para 44, and the 
presumption against absurdity was used at para 52.   
The presumed purpose also includes the entire body of accepted legal norms as they evolve from time to time. 
124 Note that in Jinyan Li and David Piccolo, “Reviving the Modern Rule in the Interpretation of Tax Statutes: Baby 
Steps Taken in Canada Trustco, Mathew, Place Dome and Imperial Oil” (2007) 3:6 CLPE Research Paper 31/2007, 
the authors wondered, at page 20, to what extent the principle of certainty, predictability and fairness overrides 
purposive interpretation” and noted that “if the court is more persuaded by the need for certainty and the taxpayer’s 
right to legitimate tax minimization, the scope of purposive interpretation in affected”.   
125 Mathew, supra note 103 at para 55.   
Page 21 
In summary, given the nature of taxation and the need for certainty and predictability in 
financial affairs, and taxpayers’ reasonable expectation that they are able to order their affairs in 
reliance to the clear meaning of statutory provisions, a court will likely:126 
• Give the text of the provision greater weight where the words of the statute are precise, 
clear, and unequivocal;  
• Give the context and purpose of the provision greater weight when the provision is open 
to more than one reasonable interpretation; and  
• In all cases come only to an interpretation that can be born by the words used in the 
provision, and can reasonably fall within the scheme and object of the act.127 
3.1.5.2. Drafting Conventions 
Those tasked with reducing the will of law-makers to writing are presumed to use words 
and phrases in a manner that accords with the conventional use of those words and phrases in the 
statute book generally.  As with any presumption, express words of or implication from the 
words of the statute may displace these presumptions.  What follows is only a sample of 
statutory drafting presumptions.128  For more exhaustive treatment consult texts on legislative 
drafting. Legislative drafting conventions include: 
• Statutes are presumed to have a logical organization, usually from the general to the 
particular; 
• Where a statute is divided into parts, the parts of the legislation are presumed to be 
distinct; 
• The statute is presumed to not use redundant words, such that all words are presumed to 
have meaning; 
• The same word is presumed to be used consistently, and carry the same meaning, 
throughout a statute; 
• Different words are presumed to have different meanings throughout the statute; 
• The word “shall” is presumed to indicate the imposition of a duty (mandatory), or when 
used with “not” or “no” a prohibition; 
• The word “may” is presumed to confer or indicate a power, right, or choice, though the 
power granted may have to be exercised once the conditions of the granting of the power 
are present; 
                                                
126 Anti-avoidance provisions and provisions providing social benefits will generally receive a wider, more liberal, 
and purposive interpretation than provisions setting tax liability and imposing penalties. See for example … 
127 in ATCO Gas & Pipelines Ltd V Alberta (Energy & Utilities Board), [2006] 1 SCR 140 at para 48, the Court 
stated that “the grammatical and ordinary sense of a section is not determinative and does not constitute the end of 
the inquiry” but that a court “is oblige to consider the total context of the provisions to be interpreted, no matter how 
plain the disposition may seem upon initial reading”.   
 
128 See for example Helen Xanthaki, Thornton’s Legislative Drafting (Bloomsbury Professional: West Sussex, UK, 
2013); or Elmer A Driedger, Materials on Legislative Drafting (University of Ottawa: Ottawa.  See also: Uniform 
Law Conference of Canada, Report of the Committee Appointed to Prepare Bilingual Legislative Drafting 
Conventions for the Uniform Law Conference of Canada (Uniform Law Conference of Canada: Ottawa, ) available 
online at http://www.ulcc.ca/en/uniform-acts-en-gb-1/546-drafting-conventions/66-drafting-conventions-act; and 
Government of Canada, Guide to Making Federal Acts and Regulations, 2nd ed (Privy Council: Ottawa, 2001), 
available online at http://www.pco-bcp.gc.ca/docs/information/publications/legislation/pdf-eng.pdf.  
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• The word “or” can be conjunctive or disjunctive (only when one of a set of criteria are 
required for the rule to apply); 
• The word “and” is conjunctive (indicate that all criteria have to be met before the rule 
applies); 
• The word “means” indicated an exhaustive definition of a term; 
• The word “includes” has two uses, either indicating an open-ended definition or 
expansive definition of a term that builds on the ordinary meaning of that term, or 
alternatively providing un-exhaustive specific examples of the defined terms meaning; 
• Where a word or phrase has a legal meaning as determined by the courts, that meaning is 
presumed to have been intended and will prevail over the ordinary meaning; 
• Where a word has a different legal meaning commercial and non-commercial contexts, 
for ITA purposes it is presumed that the legal meaning in the commercial context will 
prevail over the legal meaning in the non-commercial context; 
• Where a word or phrase is defined in the ITA, that definition will prevail over the 
ordinary or other legal meanings (not with reference to the ITA and that definition); and 
• Where a word or phrase is defined to have a particular meaning for a particular or limited 
circumstance of the ITA, that specific meaning will dominate a general definition for that 
particular or limited circumstance. 
3.1.5.3. Maxims of Statutory Interpretation 
Maxims of statutory interpretation have been developed by judges over time in response 
to the reality that certain features of legislation repeatedly reappear.  On the basis of this 
observed recurrence, inferences relating to these legislative features also tend to recur.  There is 
overlap between some of the maxims and the presumptions based on statutory drafting 
conventions, and just like the presumptions offer a tentative position for statutory interpretation. 
What follows is a listing of only some of the common maxims:129 
• Noscitur a Sociis (one is known by one’s associates) – in a string of words within a provision 
the meaning of a doubtful word can be derived from its association with the other words, 
such that each word is given meaning; 
• Ejusdem generis (of the same kind) – Where a list of specific classes of persons or things is 
followed by a general term, the general statement is presumed to be limited to items of the 
same type as those specifically enumerated; 
• Expressio unius  est exclusio alterius (the expression’s mention of one thing excludes all 
others) – Where a list of specific classes of persons or things are provided, but others that are 
similar are not listed, the presumption is that those items not expressly listed are meant to be 
excluded; 
• In pari materia (upon the same subject) – When a meaning is ambiguous, the meaning may 
be determined by referring to meanings found in the rest of the statute (based on the 
presumption that the same word has the same meaning throughout a statute); 
                                                
129 For a list of latin maxims and phrases see John N Notterell, A Collection of Latin Maxims and Phrases (Stevens 
and Haynes: London, 1913), available online at 
https://archive.org/stream/cu31924021688670/cu31924021688670_djvu.txt.  
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• Generalia specialibus non derogant (the general does not detract from the specific) – When a 
general rule/legislation is provided and its operation interferes with a specific rule/legislation, 
the specific prevails; and 
• Parliament does not speak in vain – every word in a statute should be given meaning, and no 
interpretation should render contents mere surplusage or meaningless. 
3.1.5.4. Older Rules of Statutory Interpretation  
There are various other, older, approaches to interpreting statutes.  Each of these other 
approaches may have something to contribute when interpreting provisions of the ITA, but only 
as particular applications of the three elements of the “modern rule”.  When reading older cases 
you may come across these rules being used by the courts in interpreting the ITA.  Where these 
old interpretations are not in your favour, you may be able to challenge them if a full textual, 
contextual, and purposive analysis would suggest that the older interpretation is no longer 
correct.  These older approaches include: (i) the literal meaning approach, (ii) the plain meaning 
approach, (iii) the rule to avoid absurd, unjust, or anomalous results, (iv) the mischief rule, (v) 
the legislative intention rule, (vi) the purposive approach, (vii) the pragmatic or policy approach, 
(viii) the use of extrinsic evidence. 
(i) The Literal Meaning Approach130 – This approach asks the person interpreting to look 
at the clear and literal meaning of terms used in the ITA.  This approach assumes that 
every word has one particular meaning. However,  where there is any ambiguity, the 
ambiguity is resolved in favour of the taxpayer where the provision is a charging 
provision131 and in favour of the Crown where the provision is a relieving provision, 
exemption, or deduction.132  This approach ignores the spirit of the law, the scheme of the 
Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament.  This rule has been supplanted 
in most cases by the modern rule, though courts may still make reference to it when 
dealing with very detailed provisions. 
(ii)  The Plain Meaning Approach133 – This approach asks the person interpreting to give 
the words used their ordinary meaning (absent ambiguity).  Where there is ambiguity, the 
court will need to refer to the scheme and object of the Act or the intention of parliament 
to resolve the ambiguity.  This is different from the literal meaning approach in that 
words are not assumed to have one meaning but a range of meanings, with the particular 
meaning having to be determined by reference to the internal context.  This approach has 
fallen out of favour for two reasons.134 The first reason is that the approach does not give 
any weight to discretion granted to courts by parliament and, thereby, ignores that words 
                                                
130 See for example the decisions in MNR v MacInnes, [1954] CTC 50 (Ex Ct); and Tennant v Smith, [1892] AC 
150. 
131 See Fries v The Queen, [1990] 2 CTC 429 (SCC) at 439.   
132 The asymmetry was rejected by the SCC in Corporation Notre-Dame de Mon-Secours v Communaute Urbaine 
de Quebec et al, 95 DTC 5017 (SCC) at 5022, and the court held that any ambiguity would be resolved in favour of 
the taxpayer.   
133 See for example the decisions in Lumsden v Inland Revenue Commissioners, [1914] AC 877 (HL) at 896-97; and 
R v McIntosh, [1995] 1 SCR 686.   
134 Note that the SCC in Stubart Investments Ltd v The Queen, [1984] 1 SCR 536, stated that the “plain meaning 
rule” should continue to be applied, but in a substantive sense so that if a taxpayer is within the spirit of the 
provision, the provision should apply.   
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do not have a natural meaning, only usages.  The second is that it is inconsistent with 
section 12 of the Interpretation Act.135 
(iii) The rule to avoid absurd, unjust, or anomalous results136 – This rule requires that the 
person interpreting the statute construe a provision so as to avoid irrational or unjust 
outcomes. This is so even if the language of the statute appears to be heading in the 
direction of those undesirable outcomes.  This rule is often applied where there is a 
sensible alternative available.   
(iv) The mischief rule137 – This rule requires that the person interpreting the provision 
inquire what mischief or defect the legislation is attempting to address or cure. Once the 
mischief is identified, the provision must then be interpreted so as to deal with the 
mischief and provide a remedy.  This is the rule that is codified in section 12 of the 
Interpretation Act.138   
(v) The legislative intention rule139 – This rule requires that the person interpreting the 
provision attempt to give the meaning to the statute that the legislature would have given 
that provision if they would have been faced with the particular facts and circumstances 
before the court.  The legislatures intentions can be gleaned from records of debates, and 
other government documents related to the drafting of the particular provision.  However, 
it is impossible to assign intention to a collective, diverse, legislative body whose 
members are likely not completely familiar with the content and complexity of the statute 
they are enacting or amending.   
(vi) The purposive approach140 – This approach asks the person interpreting the provision to 
decipher the social and policy goals that the provision is attempting to advance or 
promote. It looks at the reason(s) the statute was enacted and asks courts to interpret and 
apply the provision so as to achieve the legislative purpose.  However, as with legislative 
intention, the purpose of legislation is not always easy to determine. This approach may 
lead to inconsistent or uncertain applications of the provision.   
(vii) The pragmatic or policy approach141 – This approach asks the person interpreting the 
provision to set out and examine the alternative policy implications of possible 
interpretations (the impact of alternative interpretations on equity, neutrality, and 
simplicity).  The court would then choose the interpretation that yields the most 
appropriate policy outcome. To employ this approach, the researcher must use and apply 
tax policy analysis tools, and aims for a dynamic interpretation of tax law.  This 
interpretive approach is thought to be most consistent with democratic values, to operate 
as a damper to interest-group influence on legislative rule making, and to promote 
consistency with the policy goals that animate tax legislation. 
(viii) The use of extrinsic evidence – This approach asks the person interpreting the provision 
to consider the context of the provision by looking at sources outside of the statute.  The 
                                                
135 RSC 1985, c I-21. 
136 See for example the decisions in Grey v Pearson (1987), 10 ER 1216 (HL).  See also the Canadian decision in 
Moldowan v The Queen, [1977] CTC 310 (SCC).   
137 See Heydon’s Case 01584), 76 ER 637 (KB) at 638.   
138 RSC 1985, c I-21. 
139 See for example the decisions in Cartwright v City of Toronto (1914), 50 SCR 215 at 219; and Attorney-General 
v Carlton Bank, [1899] 2 QB 158 (CA) at 164.   
140 See for example the decision in Smith v Attorney General of Canada (1924), 1 DTC 45 (Ex Ct).   
141 See for example Corporation Notre-Dame de Mon-Secours v Communaute Urbaine de Quebec et al, 95 DTC 
5017 (SCC).   
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relevant context can include legislative materials (Hansard, Budget Speech, Budget 
Documents, Committee Reports, Explanatory Notes, and Press Releases), the legislative 
evolution of the provision (if any), and the social and economic context of the statute 
generally and the provision specifically.   
3.1.5.5. Additional Considerations  
In addition to applying the rules of statutory interpretation in giving meaning to words 
and phrases,142 the ITA provides internal definitions of words and phrases, makes extensive use 
of cross-references, uses ‘deeming provisions’, and provides ‘prescribed’ details in the ITR.  
These features must be considered when interpreting a provision.  All of these must be kept in 
mind when interpreting the ITA. 
The ITA defines a large number of words and phrases, some of them in ways that are not 
intuitive or part of normal English usage.143  Although many definitions are found in the 
definition part of the ITA,144 predominantly in subsection 248(1), definitions are also found in 
other parts, divisions, subdivisions, and sections of the ITA.  It is important to be aware that the 
application of a definition is not limited to the position in the ITA in which it is located, but 
rather is limited by the words used in the definition itself.145 Other terms found in the ITA are 
defined in the Interpretation Act146 for purposes of all Federal statutes.147    
The researcher will find that the ITA often uses cross-references to other provisions in the 
ITA (in the same section or other sections) or cross-references to other statutes. It is impossible 
to understand the full import of a provision containing a cross-reference without following the 
trail fully. When conducting research, it is important to read-in the words of the cross-reference 
into the provision.   
Deeming provisions148 are used to remove ambiguity or to create legal fictions in 
particular circumstances.149  Legal fictions created by deeming provisions may either supplant 
                                                
142 A great resource for judicial interpretations of tax words and phrases see Mark Jolin, Canada Tax Words, 
Phrases, and Rules, loose-leaf (Carswell: Toronto, ON, 1990).  This resource provides judicially considered tax 
words and phrases daring from 1917 onward.   
143 For more see “Defined Terms”, available online at http://ita-annotated.ca/RecentDecisions/tax-
research/interpreting-the-ita/internal/defined-terms/  
144 ITA, supra note 2 at Part XVII 
145 For example: “for purposes of the Act”; “for purposes of this section”; “for purposes of this Part”; and so on.   
146 RSC 1985, c I-21, subsection 35(1), contains a long list of definitions, including for “bank”, “Canada”, 
“corporation”, “month”, and “person”. 
147 Another common reference to the Interpretation Act is for purposes of definitions of time and dates found in 
section 26.   
148 For a great article on the different uses of deeming provisions see MN Kandev and J Lennard, “Interpreting and 
Applying Deeming Provisions of the Income Tax Act” (2012) 60:2 Can Tax J 275.  See also “Deeming Provisions” 
available online at http://ita-annotated.ca/RecentDecisions/tax-research/interpreting-the-ita/internal/deeming-
provisions/ .   
149 See R v Verrerre, [1978] 2 SCR 838, where the court stated: 
[…] A deeming provision artificially imports into a word or an expression an additional meaning 
which they would not otherwise convey beside the normal meaning which they retain where they 
are used; it plays a function of enlargement analogous to the word “includes” in certain 
definitions; however, “includes” would be logically inappropriate and would sound unreal because 
of the fictional aspect of the provision. […] 
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reality or they may merely supplement reality.  They can serve one of four (4) functions, making 
it important to understand the effect and function of particular deeming provisions.  These four 
functions are:150 
• To create a legal fiction by declaring that something exists, has certain properties, or has 
occurred regardless of the truth of the matter; 
• To declare the law; 
• To create a legal presumption by declaring that certain facts are to be taken as 
established; and 
• To confer a discretion. 
Courts generally interpret and apply deeming provisions narrowly. This means that unless 
facts and circumstances fall squarely within the express words of a deeming provision, courts 
will not impute the operation of the deeming provision (or the corollary of the deeming 
provision).   
As mentioned above, the ITA provides additional detail, when required, by using the term 
“prescribed”.151  When used, “prescribed” refers to the Regulations152 or one of the prescribed 
forms.  When this term is encountered, it is necessary to look to these other source so as to 
understand the legal effect of the particular provision.153  Regulations are there to either provide 
detail that goes beyond what is needed from Parliament, or it is used to provide for matters that 
need to respond to changing circumstances.154   
3.1.6. Tax Treaties 
Double Tax Conventions are negotiated agreements between two countries that determine 
how potential disputes will be resolved when both countries may exert jurisdiction to tax a 
certain receipt.  Although most of Canada’s tax treaties are based on the OCED Model Treaty,155 
a researcher must always refer to the specific tax treaty in force between Canada and another 
country.156   
                                                
150 See R Sullivan, Sullivan on the Construction of Statutes, 5th ed (LexisNexis: Markham, ON, 2008). 
151 The Income Tax Regulations, CRC 1978 c 945, are authorized by the ITA, section 221, which states that: 
The Governor in Council may make regulations […] prescribing anything that, by this Act, is to 
be prescribed or is to be determined or regulated by regulation. 
152 CRC 1978 c 945.   
153 Note that a prescribed form, even if mandatory, does not have the effect of overriding or being inconsistent with 
the ITA or Regulations. 
154 Regulations are much easier and quicker to pass as they are promulgated by the Governor General on the advice 
of the Privy Council (the Cabinet), and there is no need to go through the formalities of passing a Bill through 
parliament.   
155 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital 
(OECD: Paris, France, 2014), condensed version available online at http://www.keepeek.com/Digital-Asset-
Management/oecd/taxation/model-tax-convention-on-income-and-on-capital-condensed-version-2014_mtc_cond-
2014-en#page1. 
156 Canada has over 92 tax treaties in force.  For a complete list of all of Canada’s tax treaties in force see the 
Department of Finance listing available online at http://www.fin.gc.ca/treaties-conventions/in_force--eng.asp.  
Note that as part of international tax planning, you may have to consider treaties between countries other than 
Canada.  When making use of various jurisdictions and their double tax conventions, you must be aware of the 
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Tax treaties have two main purposes: (i) to reduce or eliminate double taxation,157 and (ii) 
to prevent fiscal evasion.158  Tax treaties do not impose taxes, but rather serve to divide up the 
tax pie as between the two countries, limiting those countries’ ability to, or extent of, taxation of 
certain items.  In other words, they provide relief to taxpayers in certain circumstances.  Their 
operation may result in double-non-taxation of certain receipts.  Treaties only provide relief for 
those taxes to which the treaty applies and only to those persons for whom relief is contemplated.   
When reading a tax treaty the researcher will notice that the treaty use “article” rather 
than “section”.  This difference is one of nomenclature only.  Each article will deal with a 
distinct issue or a set of related issues. All tax treaties will generally contain articles that address: 
• The counties affected (and what territory is included for purposes of each country);159 
• The taxes to which the treaty applies;160 
• Tie breaker rules for resolving residency conflicts;161 
• Rules as to jurisdiction to tax certain types of receipt or income;162 
• Rules as to who double taxation is to be eliminated;163 
• Some contain rules that limit benefits of the tax treaty;164 and 
• Various other rules.165 
As with contracts and statutes, tax treaties will need to be interpreted before the articles 
can be given effect in particular circumstances.  The interpretive exercise, however, is different 
than that for statutes.  Given that treaties do not impose taxes themselves, represent an inter-
governmental compromise of their tax jurisdiction, and represent a bargain as between the 
                                                                                                                                                       
Canadian and OECD work to counter treaty shopping.  For example see Consultation Paper on Treaty Shopping – 
The Problem and Possible Solutions (Department of Finance: Ottawa, ON, 2013), available online at 
http://www.fin.gc.ca/activty/consult/ts-cf-eng.asp. See also BEPS Action 6: Preventing the Granting of Treaty 
Benefits in Inappropriate Circumstances (OECD: Paris, France, 2014), available online at 
http://www.oecd.org/ctp/treaties/treaty-abuse-discussion-draft-march-2014.pdf. 
157 This can happen, for example, when a person is a resident of two countries and therefore is subject to taxation in 
both countries on their entire world-wide income.  If a tax treaty exists between these two countries, it will provide 
residence tie-breaker rules that will seek to assign residency to one or the other country.  For an example of the 
application of the tie-breaker rules see Black v The Queen, 2014 TCC 12, aff’d 2014 FCA 275.  Summary available 
online at http://ita-annotated.ca/RecentDecisions/double-residents-effect-resident-tie-breaker-rules-tax-conventions-
black/.  
158 This will be achieved by facilitating with the administration of each country’s tax legislation by allowing for the 
exchange of information (automatic or on request) between the tax authorities of each of the two countries.  
Although tax laws of one country are generally not enforced in another country, tax treaties may in some cases 
authorize one country to assist with the collection of another country’s tax debt: see for example the Canada-US Tax 
Treaty, which in Article XXVI A provides for “Assistance in Collection” and in Article XXVII which provides for 
“Exchange of Information”.   
159 In the OECD Model Treaty in Article 1 
160 In the OECD Model Treaty in Article 2. 
161 In the OECD Model Treaty in Articles 4 and 5. 
162 In the OECD Model Treaty in Articles 6-21 (“Taxation of Income”) and Articles 22 (“Taxation of Capital”). 
163 In the OECD Model Treaty in Articles 23A and 23B. 
164 Limitation of benefits provisions are not common in tax treaties. In the Canadian context, such a provision is only 
found in the Canada-US treaty, Article XXIX A, and limits the benefits in the treaty to “qualifying persons”.   
165 For example, in the OECD Model Treaty: Article 3 covers “General Definitions”; Article 24 dealing with “non-
discrimination”; and Article 25 dealing with the “Mutual agreement procedure”.   
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countries for the benefit of their general societies, the interpretive exercise gives greater weights 
to the intention of the parties to the agreement.  
Since tax treaties are treaties, their interpretation is governed by the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties.166  Specifically, Section 3 of that treaty, entitled “Interpretation of 
Treaties” provides a set of rules in Articles 31 to 33, that inform the interpretive exercise.  
Article 31 provides the general rules applicable when interpreting treaties, and highlights the 
importance of interpreting the treaty in good faith so as to obtain the ordinary meaning of the 
words used.167  In seeking to obtain the ordinary meaning, the words used must be considered in 
their context, and in light of the objects and purpose of the treaty and the provisions being 
interpreted.  Article 32 provides guidance on the use of supplementary means of interpreting 
treaties so as to confirm the meaning obtained after applying the rules in Article 31.168  Article 33 
deals with interpretation of treaties authenticated in two or more languages.169 
                                                
166 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Concluded on 23 May 1969, available online at 
https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%201155/volume-1155-I-18232-English.pdf.  
167 Article 31 reads: 
1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the 
terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.  
2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in addition to the text, 
including its preamble and annexes:  
(a)  Any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in connexion 
with the conclusion of the treaty;  
(b)  Any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connexion with the conclusion of 
the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to the treaty.  
3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context:  
(a)  Any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the 
application of its provisions;  
(b)  Any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the 
parties regarding its interpretation;  
(c)  Any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties.  
4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties so intended.  
168 Article 32 reads: 
Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory work of the 
treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to confirm the meaning resulting from the 
application of article 31, or to determine the meaning when the interpretation according to article 31:  
(a) Leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or 
(b) Leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.  
169 Article 33 reads: 
1. When a treaty has been authenticated in two or more languages, the text is equally authoritative in 
each language, unless the treaty provides or the parties agree that, in case of divergence, a particular 
text shall prevail.  
2. A version of the treaty in a language other than one of those in which the text was authenticated 
shall be considered an authentic text only if the treaty so provides or the parties so agree.  
3. The terms of the treaty are presumed to have the same meaning in each authentic text.  
4. Except where a particular text prevails in accordance with paragraph 1, when a comparison of the 
authentic texts discloses a difference of meaning which the application of articles 31 and 32 does not 
remove, the meaning which best reconciles the texts, having regard to the object and purpose of the 
treaty, shall be adopted.  
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When interpreting tax treaty provisions four general rules apply:170 
• The interpretation rules in the Income Tax Conventions Interpretation Act171 must be 
applied; 
• The treaty must be interpreted in good faith and in light of its objects and purpose;172 
• The paramount goal is finding the meaning of the words of the treaty by taking a 
liberal and purposive approach, looking a the language used, determining the 
intention of the parties, and using extrinsic materials to illustrate and illuminate the 
parties’ intentions;173 and 
• The interpretation of a treaty must be one that is functional, and therefore one where 
the whole scheme is considered in light of its intent, object, and spirit.174 
The Canadian courts have often consulted the OECD Model Treaty175, particularly the 
commentaries to the various articles, so as to interpret similar wording used in Canadian tax 
treaties or so as to infer a meaning from omission of, or use of, certain words, phrases, and 
provisions.176  Note that the Canada-US Tax Treaty does not follow the OECD model, but it can 
be interpreted using the Technical Explanations177 published by the US Treasury Department.178   
3.2.Case Law 
3.2.1. Overview 
Determining the appropriate and relevant statutory rules that are applicable to particular 
facts is not the end.  The ITA (and other legislation) is written in general terms so as to cover a 
wide variety of foreseeable (and sometimes unforeseeable) occurrences.  As such, most 
legislative provisions will require some form of interpretation to give them meaning in a 
                                                
170 For a good article dealing with the interpretation of tax treaties see John Pebble, “Interpretation of Double Tax 
Conventions” (1993) 78 International Tax Law 469, available online at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1582263.  
171 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital 
(OECD: Paris, France, 2014), condensed version available online at http://www.keepeek.com/Digital-Asset-
Management/oecd/taxation/model-tax-convention-on-income-and-on-capital-condensed-version-2014_mtc_cond-
2014-en#page1. 
172 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, United Nations Treaty Series (1980) Vol 1155, I-18232, available 
online at https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%201155/volume-1155-I-18232-English.pdf.  
Article 31 provides the general rules for interpreting treaties, and Article 32 provides for the use of supplementary 
means when interpreting treaties.   
173 The Queen v Crown Forest Industries Limited et al, [1995] 2 SCR 802. 
174 Swathe v R, 1994 CarswellNat 1020 (FCA). 
175 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital 
(OECD: Paris, France, 2014), condensed version available online at http://www.keepeek.com/Digital-Asset-
Management/oecd/taxation/model-tax-convention-on-income-and-on-capital-condensed-version-2014_mtc_cond-
2014-en#page1. 
176 The Queen v Crown Forest Industries Limited et al, [1995] 2 SCR 802. 
177 For a copy of the US Model Income Tax Convention and Model Technical Explanations see 
http://www.irs.gov/Individuals/International-Taxpayers/The-U.S.-Model-Income-Tax-Convention-and-Model-
Technical-Explanation.   
For the text of particular technical interpretations of the Canada-US Treaty see http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
trty/canatech.pdf and http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/treaties/Documents/tecanada08.pdf . 
178 The Department of Finance has stated that the US Technical Interpretations of the Canada-US Tax Treaty 
accurately reflect Canada’s position as to the interpretation of that treaty’s provisions.  
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particular context.  Case law (judicial decisions) is a primary source of law that interprets 
legislative provisions.  Where a court has settled a question within its jurisdiction and at issue in 
that case,179 then the court has done away with some sort of disagreement as to the interpretation 
and application of that particular provision.  This decision can either be binding on other courts 
or can be persuasive,180 and in either case provides guidance for tax lawyers.   
This portion of the paper will first set out the various courts whose decisions may                       
have to be considered when trying to give meaning to tax legislation, and then provide guidance 
for reading, analyzing, and applying various courts’ decisions.   
3.2.2. What Court(s) to Look at 
The jurisdiction over income tax matters, at first instance, is divided amongst the Tax 
Court of Canada (“TCC”), Federal Court – Trial Division (“FCTD”), and provincial superior 
courts.181  A researcher will need to know what court has jurisdiction over what matters so as to 
focous the research appropriately.182  This separation of jurisdictions, particularly as between the 
FCTD and the TCC has been criticized as making matters too complicated for taxpayers and 
their advisors. 
The TCC has, since July 2003, been constituted as a superior court.  This court deals with 
the correctness and propriety of the assessment, reassessment, or additional assessment of tax.  
Therefore where the issue involves a question as to the validity of an assessment, reassessment, 
or additional assessment, or a question of the admissibility of evidence to support an assessment, 
                                                
179 It is only matters at issue in a case that can give rise to binding precedent and identify the ratio of a case.  The 
difference between ratio and obiter will be discussed later in the paper.   
180 Whether a decision or one court is binding or persuasive, whether it is applied or distinguished, will depend on 
the similarity of the particular facts of the two cases and the rules of stare decisis.  For an explanation of the doctrine 
of stare decisis see the Federal Court of Appeal decision in Tuccaro v Canada, 2014 FCA 184, summarized online 
at http://ita-annotated.ca/RecentDecisions/res-judicata-stare-decisis-doctrines-explained/ .   
181 When doing tax research, you have to keep in mind the evolution of the system used to settle tax disputes.  What 
is currently the Tax Court of Canada, was not always so. Prior to the Tax Court of Canada we had: 
• Income Tax Appeals Board, 1949 – 1959; 
• Tax Appeal Review Board, 1958 – 1971; 
• Tax Review Board, 1971 – 1983; and 
• Appeals were to the Exchequer Court, 1917 – 1971, and then to the Federal Court – Trial Division, 1971 – 
1983. 
The Tax Court of Canada took over the jurisdiction over determining the correctness of tax liability from 1983 on.  
For General Procedure proceedings, appeals from decisions: 
• Were to the Federal Court – Trial Division, 1983 – 1990; and 
• Are to the Federal Court of Appeal, 1991 – current. 
Note that the Tax Court of Canada has limited jurisdiction.  The Federal Court – Trial Division, or Provincial 
superior courts may have jurisdiction over a particular matter, and therefore research will have to focous on those 
courts in particular circumstances. 
The final court of appeal for Canada was to the UK Privy Council until 1949, after which the Supreme Court of 
Canada (established in 1875) the ultimate court of appeal in Canada.   
For a more in-depth analysis of the history of Income Tax appeals see Colin Campbell, Administration of Income 
Tax 2013 (Carswell: Toronto, ON, 2013) at chapter 13.   
182 For a paper discussing the jurisdiction of the TCC to deal with Constitutional challenges, see David Jacyk, “The 
Jurisdiction of the Tax Court: A Tax Practitioner’s Guide to the Jurisdictional Galaxy of Constitutional Challenges” 
(2012) 60:1 Canadian Tax Journal. 
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or the law as to the adequacy of procedure in making an assessment, the TTC’s decisions should 
be looked at.183  In addition to income tax matters, the TCC also deals with appeals respecting a 
number of other statutes.184 Specifically, the TCC has exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and 
determine,185 inter alia:186 
• Appeals and references with respect to matters arising under the ITA, Canada Pension 
Plan,187 Employment Insurance Act,188 Part IX of Excise Tax Act,189 Old Age Security 
Act,190 and Petroleum and Gas Revenue Tax Act191, Softwood Lumber Products Export 
Charge Act,192 Cultural Property Export and Import Act,193 Customs Act,194 Investment 
Canada Act,195 and Air Travelers Security Charge Act196;197 
• Determination of questions of law or mixed fact and law referred to the TCC pursuant to 
ITA, sections 173 or 174, and Excise Tax Act,198 sections 310 or 311; 
• Appeals with respect to matters arising under the War Veterans Allowance Act,199 and 
Civilian War-Related Benefits Act200;201 and 
• Applications to extend time to file an objection or appeal under the ITA or the Excise Tax 
Act.202 
The FCTD has jurisdiction to hear and determine judicial review applications that 
challenge a decision by the Minister or his/her delegates. This is because the Minister is a 
“federal board, commission or other tribunal”, and the FCTD has wide powers and exclusive 
                                                
183 See Canada (National Revenue) v JP Morgan Asset Management (Canada) Inc, 2013 FCA 250. 
184 For example the Canada Pension Plan, , and the Employment Insurance Act, .   
185 Note that the ITA limits the remedies that can be granted by the TCC on appeal.  For example, subsection 169(1) 
allows the TCC to vary or vacate the assessment.  Specifically, section 171, in subsection 171(1) allows the TCC to 
dispose of an appeal by: 
 (a) dismissing it; or 
 (b) allowing it and 
 (i) vacating the assessment, 
 (ii) varying the assessment, or 
  (iii) referring the assessment back to the Minister for reconsideration and reassessment. 
186 Tax Court of Canada Act, RSC 1985 c T-5, section 12.  
187 RSC 1985, c C-8. 
188 SC 1996, c 23. 
189 RSC 1985, c E-15.  The rules of practice and procedure for these appeals from the Excise Tax Act (and other 
legislation) are at times separate and distinct from those applicable to appeals under the ITA.  However, the TCC is 
in the process of producing a unified and single set of rules of practice and procedure for all appeals over which it 
has jurisdiction.   
190 RSC 1985, c O-9. 
191 RSC 1985, c P-12. 
192 SC 2006, c 13. 
193 RSC 1985, c C-51. 
194 RSC 1985, c 1 (5th Supp). 
195 RSC 1985, C 28 (1st Supp). 
196 SC 2002, c 9.  
197 Where those acts generally or specifically provide for appeals to the TCC. 
198 RSC 1985, c E-15. 
199 RSC 1985, c W-3. 
200 RSC 1985, c C-31. 
201 See Veterans Review and Appeal Board Act, SC 1995, c 18, Section 33, provides that any questions as to source 
of income or income shall lie with the TCC. 
202 RSC 1985, c E-15.   
Page 32 
jurisdiction with respect of judicial review of the Minister’s decisions.203  For example, where 
the ITA grants the Minister a discretionary power, the exercise or failure to exercise that power 
may be challenged by applying or judicial review by the FCTD.  However, for such an 
application to lie:204 
• The claim must be a cognizable administrative law claim, not a disguised or collateral 
attach on an assessment, reassessment, or additional assessment (or other matter falling 
within the jurisdiction of the TCC or another court); 
• The FC must not be prevented with dealing with the claim because of Federal Courts 
Act,205 section 18.5 (where jurisdiction has been granted to another court) or another rule 
of law (other remedies available but not sought); and 
• The FC must be able to grant the relief sought. 
In addition to hearing judicial review applications challenging the Minister’s exercise of 
power, the FCTD has jurisdiction with respect to: 
• Certification of corporate liabilities as part of a Director’s liability assessment;206 and 
• Certification of amounts payable under the ITA.207 
The ITA expressly grants power in relation to certain matters to particular courts.  The 
FCTD and provincial superior courts have jurisdiction under the ITA to: 
• Grant and review collection action under the collection and jeopardy provisions;208  
• Authorize the entry of a dwelling place;209 
• Authorize the disclosure of Third-Party information;210 and 
• Determination of claims of solicitor-client privilege.211 
The FCA has jurisdiction under the ITA to: 
• Determine appeals from notices of revocation of Registered Education Savings Plans;212 
• Determination of appeals from notices of revocation of Registered Pension Plans;213 and 
• Determination of appeals from notices of revocation of a Registered Charity or a 
Registered Canadian Amateur Athletic Association.214 
 
                                                
203 Federal Courts Act, RSC 1985, c F-7, sections 18 and 18.1. 
204 See Canada (National Revenue) v JP Morgan Asset Management (Canada) Inc, 2013 FCA 250. 
205 RSC 1985, c F-17. 
206 ITA s 227.1; and Excise Tax Act s 323. 
207 ITA s 223. 
208 ITA s 225.2. 
209 ITA s 231.1. 
210 ITA s 231.2. 
211 ITA s 232. 
212 ITA s 146.1. 
213 ITA s 147.1. 
214 ITA s 168. 
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Finally, the FCTD and provincial superior courts have jurisdiction to hear matters, within 
their respective jurisdictions, to hear matters relating to: 
• Breach of contract claims; 
• Tort claims (regulatory negligence, negligent misrepresentation, fraud, abuse of process, 
or misfeasance in public office)215; and 
• Criminal law matters. 
The above partial listing of courts and jurisdictions is meant to cover tax cases only.  
However, as stated earlier, the ITA functions against the backdrop of the common law and other 
statutes (and cases interpreting those statutes) that make up the legal landscape.  These non-tax 
cases may need to be understood to appreciate the tax consequences of the facts before the 
researcher.   
3.2.3. Reading Court Decisions 
The purpose of reading court’s decision is not only to understand what the law is (or was 
at a particular point in time), but also to predict how a court may decide a future case given 
particular facts.  Making predictions based on past cases is a special skill that requires the 
researcher to identify the legal principles found in a case and understand the rules that determine 
if and to what extent another court must follow the same principles.216  Whether a subsequent 
court is bound by another court’s decision or not, and whether the other court’s decision is 
persuasive or not, depends on the level and jurisdiction of the courts involved, the facts of the 
cases being compared, and the matters at issue in a case being relied on.   
In reading court decisions, the researcher will notice that there is a difference between the 
decisions of courts of first instance and the decisions of courts of appeal.  The decisions of courts 
of first instance tend to focous more on the evidence and the facts as it is the responsibility of 
these courts to find the facts to which the law will be applied.   The decisions of courts of appeal 
will tend to focous more on the law and give deference to the trail court’s findings of facts 
(absent a palpable and overriding error).  This is because the role of courts of appeal is to 
determine questions of law, and they are not well positioned to make findings of fact as they do 
not hear witness testimony.  Also, decisions of courts of appeal tend to be longer, as they tend to 
review and analyze the legal issues in more detail so as to provide guidance for lower courts.   
Reading, analyzing, and applying court decisions as part of legal research is not an easy 
task.   The skills required to make use of court decisions are honed through practice and 
experience.  However, there are some guidelines and rules that can help get the researcher started 
on the path.  A researcher will need to understand, inter alia: the difference between the 
                                                
215 See Canada (National Revenue) v JP Morgan Asset Management (Canada) Inc, 2013 FCA 250. 
216 A good litigator also understands the importance of understanding the particular judge one will argue in front, as 
well as have developed the skills that make a person a persuasive presenter of information.  Many books have been 
written on the topic of advocacy, including: David W Chodikoff, Advocacy and Taxation in Canada (Irvin Law: 
Toronto, 2004); Geoffrey Adair, On Trial: Advocacy Skills Law & Practice, 2nd ed (Butterworths Canada; Toronto, 
2004);  Gerry Spence, Win your case: How to present, Persuade, and Prevail – Every Place, Every Time (Martin’s 
Press, 2006); Irving Younger, The Irving Younger Collection”: Wisdom & Wit from the Master of Trial Advocacy 
(American Bar Association, 2011). 
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decisions of trial courts/courts of first instance and the decisions of appeal courts; the difference 
between binding decisions and persuasive decisions; the operation of stare decisis; and the 
difference between obiter and ratio in decisions.  This is part art and part science. 
The first task is knowing what types of information can be found in a judgment.  Court 
decisions (judgments), either explicitly or implicitly, will present the following information: 
• Style of Cause;217 
• Judge(s) rendering the decision(s);218 
• Headnotes;219 
• Counsel;220 
• Procedural History;221 
• Facts;222 
• Issues;223 
• Argument(s);224 
• Analysis (decision proper);225 
• Conclusion; and226 
• Costs.227 
It is also important to understand the relationship of the various courts to one another.  
Canadian courts are arranged hieratically.228  For tax matters, the TCC and the FCTD are the 
lowest level of court, followed by the FCA, and sitting at the apex is the Supreme Court of 
                                                
217 Also known as the case name, this is the formal name the case is referred to by, indexed as, and cited using.  The 
manner of presenting the style of cause is determined by the identity of the parties and the applicable rules of court.  
218 At the TCC and the FCTD, there will only be one judge who will hear and render a decision.  At the Federal 
Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court of Canada, a panel of judges will render a decision.   
219 Headnotes are not part of the court’s judgment, but rather is a summary and interpretation of the decision by a 
legal writer. They cannot be relied on as law. 
220 The lawyer(s) representing the Crown and the taxpayer are named in the decision.  You will find that decisions at 
the TCC and the FCTD often will identify the appellant as representing himself/herself.  Unrepresented litigants 
have increased at all levels of court.   
221 This is a recounting of the steps taken prior to the matter coming before the court rendering the decision. 
222 This may include an agreed statement of facts as well as the uncontroversial facts established during the hearing.  
This portion may also include legally irrelevant facts that provide the social and historical context of the case. 
223 Courts will often identify the issues that they must decide in rendering a decision.  This may be presented either 
in the body of a paragraph or, as is becoming increasingly common, in point form. 
224 This is where the arguments advanced by each side are summarized by the court. 
225 This is the portion of the judgment where the court will identify the law, settle factual controversies (by making 
findings of fact), and settle any controversial legal questions. 
226 Most courts will provide a brief summary of the substance of the decision. 
227 At or near the end of the decision, the court will refer to courts.  Often the court will award cost to the winning 
party, thereby requiring the losing party to cover some or all of the winning party’s legal costs and disbursements.  
How much, and how, such costs awards are determined, and what factors are considered, is beyond the scope of this 
paper.  For a good summary for the TCC see Spruce Credit Union v The Queen, 2014 TCC 42, summary available 
online at http://ita-annotated.ca/RecentDecisions/fixed-cost-awards-tax-court-canada-spruce-credit/.  
228 The structure of Canada’s court system is described on the SCC website at http://www.scc-csc.gc.ca/court-
cour/sys-eng.aspx.   
Note that because of the interaction of the federal nature of the ITA with Québec’s Civil Law system, federal tax 
cases must be considered carefully so as to determine whether the outcome is dependent on or independent from the 
Civil Code of Quebec.  
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Canada (“SCC”).229  Through the operation of the principles of stare decisis, lower courts are 
required to follow – are bound by – the decisions of higher courts.230  This means that the TCC 
or the FCTD is bound231 by a decision of the FCA or the SCC, and the FCA is bound by a 
decision of the SCC.232  However, the decisions of provincial or territorial courts of appeal are 
not biding on the TCC, FCTD, or the FCA, though they may be persuasive.233  Similarly, 
decisions by the same level of court (by different judges of the same court) are not binding, they 
are merely persuasive.234  Finally, decisions rendered by courts in response to a reference 
question are not binding but merely persuasive. 
However, just because a higher court has made a decision in one case that involves 
similar facts and the operation of the same provision(s) does not mean that a lower court is 
automatically bound by the higher court’s decision.  Where the lower court makes findings of 
fact that are different than that in the higher court decision and determines that those facts are 
significant facts, or where the applicable law is different or has changed since the higher court 
decision was rendered, the lower court may distinguish the higher court decision.  By 
distinguishing the higher court decision, the lower court is freed to come to its own 
conclusions.235  This is because, in the common law tradition, courts make decisions in a case 
based on the particular facts of that case.  Although a court may make a statement as to the law 
that appears to be one of general application, this may be nothing more than a solid starting point 
from which a researcher (and another court) begins his/her analysis.  The goal, in each case, is to 
                                                
229 For a summary of the history of the court hierarchy in relation to tax matters, see supra note 118.   
230 For an explanation of the doctrine of stare decisis see the Federal Court of Appeal decision in Tuccaro v Canada, 
2014 FCA 184, summarized online at http://ita-annotated.ca/RecentDecisions/res-judicata-stare-decisis-doctrines-
explained/ .   
231 Where the facts before the court are the same as (on all fours as) the facts before the higher court, the lower court 
must follow the same reasoning as the higher court and the outcome of the case must be the same as under the 
higher court.   
232 For tax cases, other than criminal tax cases, there is no automatic right of appeal to the SCC.  Rather, a party 
wishing to appeal a FCA decision to the SCC must apply for leave to appeal.  The SCC will only grant leave to 
appeal where the court considers that the issue is one of national importance. 
Note that courts of appeal can hear appeals with a differing number of judges sitting on a panel.  The FCA may hear 
a case sitting either as a panel of 3 judges or a panel of 5 judges.  The SCC may hear a case sitting either as a panel 
of 5, 7, or 9 judges.  Generally, for a court to overturn its own decision, this will have to be done by a panel of 
judges that consists of more judges than rendered the impugned decision.  
233 When a decision is persuasive, and the extent to which it is persuasive, may sway the court to come to a similar 
or the same decision as the other court did.  The closer a case is in facts and law to the particular case before a judge, 
the more persuasive the other decision will be.   Judges will often refer to the principle of “judicial comity”, and 
whenever possible attempt to reach the same conclusion as other courts have reached in substantially similar cases in 
substantially similar circumstances.  The more judges of a particular court have reached a particular disposition in a 
matter, the more likely it is that other judges of that court will also approach a case in the same way.  This practice 
of judges of a level of court following decisions of other judges at that level also promotes certainty and 
predictability of the law whenever possible.   
The persuasiveness of a decision is affected by its age (more recent decisions are more reflective of the current 
thinking of the court and its judges and are more likely to persuade them), and how it has been judicially considered 
(a decision that has been approved of and followed by other courts is more persuasive than one that has been 
distinguished, not followed, or questioned by other courts). 
234 Cases decided under the Informal Procedure of the TCC have no precedential value.  Only those under the 
General Procedure have some precedential value.   
235 For a good example of how lower courts may distinguish a case, even when the issues are significantly the same, 
see the British Colombia Supreme Court decision in Carter v Canada (AG), 2012 BCSC 1587, and the British 
Colombia Court of Appeal’s overturning of that decision in 2013 BCCA 435.   
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render a decision that is right and just given the law at the time the matter comes before a court 
and based on the fact proved in that case.   
It is also important to distinguish between the obiter dicta236 of a decision and its ratio 
decidendi.237  The ratio of a higher court is binding on a lower court, but the dicta of a higher 
court is not binding of a lower.238  Differentiating between ratio and obiter can be difficult, often 
requiring a careful reading and deep understanding of the case.  This analysis is further 
complicated when the higher court decision is a split decision with one or more concurring 
decisions239 and dissenting decisions240, and especially when the split is not the same as among 
all of the issues before the court.241 
After the researcher has determined what cases are binding and which are persuasive, has 
distilled the relevant facts for each decision, and sifted ratio from obiter, s/he still has to apply 
this knowledge to the facts and circumstances of a particular client.  The more uncertain a 
particular area is, the more difficult this task becomes.  The researcher must reason by analogy 
and determine what portions of the client’s facts are similar to or different from the previously 
decided case, whether these differences are significant, and what the outcome may be given these 
differences.  Successful prediction is a matter of judgment developed through experience.  
Finally, it is important for the researcher to assure himself/herself that the wording of the 
provisions (and the state of the common law, where applicable) is the same now as when the 
previous decisions were rendered, and that the decision relied on has not been appealed.  The 
ITA is amended often, and it may well be that the wording supporting a decision has been 
amended such that the reasoning in that old decision is not longer sound.  A decision may also 
have been appealed or may be under appeal.  The soundness of the reasoning of a decision may 
be undermined if that decision is overturned on appeal, and caution must be exercised when an 
important decision is under appeal.242 
                                                
236 Obiter dicta (called obiter for short) are “comments made as an aside” by a judge, and are in reference to matters 
not at issue in the particular case, or matters that need not be decided to render a decision in a particular case.    
237 Ratio decidendi (called ratio for short) are “reasons for the decision” by the judge, and address the matters at 
issue in a case, and are matters that must be decided in order for the court to be able to render a decision.   
238 Obiters of higher court decisions are often very persuasive because such comments hint at the thinking of the 
higher court, and indicate how those judges may decide a case on appeal. 
239 A concurring decision is one or more judges agreeing with the outcome of the case as determined by the majority 
decision, but differing as to the law leading to the result. 
240 A dissenting decision is one or more judges disagreeing with the outcome, whether or not they agree or disagree 
as to the law leading to the outcome.   
241 Also note that the fact that courts of appeal are composed of panels consisting of varing number of judges may 
affect the persuasive weight to be given to decisions.  The obiter of a SCC decision rendered by a panel of 5 judges 
will not be as persuasive as one rendered by a panel of 9 judges, and the obiter in split decisions will not be as 
persuasive as the obiter in unanimous decisions. 
242 Note that a tax appeal does not get to the Supreme Court of Canada as of right.  The person seeking to appeal has 
to apply for leave to appeal.  The SCC may or may not grant an application for leave to appeal.  The failure to grant 
leave does not mean that the SCC agrees with the reasoning of the court below, but only that the SCC has 
determined that the case does not meet the standards necessary to be heard by the SCC (for example, the matter is 
not one of national interest).   
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4. Secondary Sources of Tax Law 
4.1.Overview 
Secondary sources of law are not “law”, but rather are interpretations, comments, history, 
and analysis of law. Such sources include government publications, legislative debates, scholarly 
papers, textbooks, articles, and commercial commentary and analysis.  They provide an overview 
of the law, some commentary and historical development, reference to leading cases, often 
provide the researcher with a list of related provisions, and listings of other relevant secondary 
sources.  This makes secondary sources a good starting point for legal research.  However, a 
researcher should always consider the date on which a secondary source was published/prepared, 
and understand that such sources are often not up to date.   
4.2.Non-Government Secondary Sources 
There are a large number of Canadian and international secondary sources of tax law.  
These materials may be prepared either for practitioners (accountants or lawyers), academics, 
taxpayers, or students (or for a combination of these persons). For tax law, the most commonly 
referred to secondary sources are: 
• Tax textbooks;243 
• Tax scholarly papers;244 
• International Financial Reporting Standards245 and related documents, and the Canadian 
Chartered Professional Accountants Manual; 
• Tax Professional Publications and Guides (eg. Looseleaf services, annotated acts, etc.); 
and 
• Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Model Tax Treaty and its 
commentary.246 
It is a good idea for a researcher to being by looking at a reputable secondary source so as 
to get a general understanding of the law.  A good secondary source will also point the researcher 
towards related provisions, related statutes, and leading cases. This can save the researcher time 
and effort.  However, each type of secondary source has its uses, focous, and limitations.  For 
example, textbooks tend to provide general, academically focoused, reviews of the law, and they 
                                                
243 There are many Canadian textbooks that deal with domestic income taxation generally.  There are also a great 
many textbooks and treatises that deal with particular and specialized areas of tax law.   
244 Two great sources for tax-related scholarly papers are http://ssrn.com and http://ctf.ca (which also contains a 
large volume of practitioner related materials).   
Other organizations that provide secondary resources include: Tax Executives Institute, Chartered Professional 
Accountants (CPA) Canada, CPA Tax Policy Committee, CPA Commodity Tax Committee, Joint Committee on 
Taxation of the CBA and CPA, and the International Fiscal Association. 
245 These are designated as the common international accounting language that allows company accounts to be 
understandable and comparable across international boundaries.  The standards are set and modified by the 
International Accounting Standards Broad.  For more information see http://ifrs.org.  
246 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital 
(OECD: Paris, France, 2014), condensed version available online at http://www.keepeek.com/Digital-Asset-
Management/oecd/taxation/model-tax-convention-on-income-and-on-capital-condensed-version-2014_mtc_cond-
2014-en#page1. 
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also tend to be updated less frequently.  Scholarly papers, on the other hand, tend to focous on 
narrow areas of the law, and provide fairly detailed commentary and criticism of that particular 
area.  A researcher should consult a variety of secondary sources so as to get as complete an 
overview as possible. 
4.3.Government Secondary Sources 
Government publications of interest to the income tax researcher can be those either from 
the Department of Finance247 or the Canada Revenue Agency (“CRA”).248  Because of the 
volume and complexity of tax law, tax lawyers, accountants, and the public make frequent use of 
government publications so as to understand the law.249  The most often referred to source of 
government documents for income tax purposes are publications by the Canada Revenue 
Agency.250  These CRA’s publications include:251 
• Income Tax Folios: these are replacing the Interpretation Bulletins and  Income Tax 
Technical News, and present the CRA’s interpretation of the law;252 
• Income Tax Information Circulars: expressions of the CRA’s procedures, policies, and 
assessment practices;253 
• Income Tax Interpretation Bulletins: expressions of the CRA’s opinion as to the 
interpretation of the ITA;254 
                                                
247 The Department of Finance is responsible for drafting new tax law and amendments to tax law.  When bills are 
introduced to Parliament they are often accompanied by explanatory notes (called technical notes) that set out the 
purpose of the draft legislation.  The technical notes generally set out what the law was prior to the change proposed 
in the draft, why the change is being made, and what the effects of the proposed change will be.  This is not 
determinative, and one must be alive to the amendments made to a bill during the legislative process.   
Other important Department of Finance publications are the federal Budget papers (consisting of the budget speech, 
the supplementary information, and the Notice of Ways and Means Motions), press releases announcing upcoming 
changes, Regularity Impact Analysis Statements (explaining the purpose behind changes in regulations), various 
policy papers, Economic and Fiscal Updates, Fiscal Monitor, Tax Expenditure Reports, Debt management Reports, 
Debt Management Strategies, Annual Financial Reports of the Government of Canada, Fiscal Reference Tables, and 
comfort letters (confirming the intention of the department to recommend changes to the ITA in particular ways).   
Department of Finance publications are available online at http://www.fin.gc.ca.  
248 The Canada Revenue Agency is takes with the administration and the enforcement of the ITA (and a number of 
other statutes).   
249 Note that courts in Canada have consistently held that such government publications are not the law and are not 
binding even on the government or agency that publishes the document, though there are limited uses for such 
guidelines: Therrien v The Queen, 2004 TCC 791.  For an analysis of the legal effect of guidelines see Lorne Sossin 
and Sas Ansari, “Legitimate Expectations, soft law and tax administration” (Forthcoming).   
250 The Canada Revenue Agency (“CRA”) publications are generally available online at http://www.cra.gc.ca.   
Some publications are only available through Access to Information Act requests through commercial publishers.   
251 For links to websites containing these publications go to http://ita-annotated.ca/RecentDecisions/tax-
research/sources-of-information/government-publications/.  
Other CRA publications include: Canada Pension Plan Rulings, Employment Insurance Rulings, GST/HST Rulings 
and interpretations, CRA fact sheets, and tax tips. 
252 Income tax folios are organized into broad categories, and can be found online at http://www.cra-
arc.gc.ca/tx/tchncl/ncmtx/ntrfls-eng.html.  
253 Archived Information Circulars can be found online at http://www.cra-arc.gc.ca/menu/ICSC-e.html.  
254 Archived Interpretation Bulletins can be found online at http://www.cra-arc.gc.ca/menu/ITSC-eng.html.  
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• Income Tax Technical Interpretations and other Interpretations: produced by the 
CRA’s Rulings Directorate, that set out the CRA’s interpretation of particular provisions 
(available through commercial services); 
• Income Tax Technical News: Announce changes to interpretative positions or 
administrative policy, practice, or procedures;255 
• Sector Publications: publications targeted to particular sectors (eg Charities and non-
profit organizations; 
• Advanced Income Tax Rulings: the CRA’s assessment of the tax consequences of a 
transaction or proposed transaction, on specific facts, issued on the request (and at the 
expense) of a taxpayer; 
• Application Policies: Dealing with the Scientific Research and Experimental 
Development tax credit; 
• CRA Appeals Manual: An internal guide for CRA employees that are tasked with 
determining appeals; 
• CRA Audit Manual: An internal guide for CRA employees that are tasked with 
conducting audits; 
• Tax Forms: forms that are issued because they are “prescribed” have the force of law, 
while other forms do not;256 
• Tax Guides: Non-technical information for use by the general public;257 
• CRA Pamphlets: non-technical publications that deal with particular income tax 
matters;258 
• News Releases: Generally inform the public about changes in the CRA’s administration 
of the ITA; and 
• Various Rates (Income Tax Rates, Prescribed Rates, etc) 
CRA and other government publications are not law and do not have the force of law.259  
Taxpayers are not able to rely on these publications and pronouncements, and the government is 
generally not estopped from acting contrary to these declared views in such publications and 
pronouncements.260  This inability to rely on the CRA statements is not limited to publications 
and pronouncements to the general public, but also extend to express promises or views 
expressed to particular taxpayers in advance tax rulings (despite the CRA’s position and 
consistent practice of regarding such rulings as binding).261  One thing these documents do 
provide is the position that the tax authority is likely to take.  As such, if the researcher’s goal is 
                                                
255 Archived Income Tax Technical News can be found online at http://www.cra-arc.gc.ca/tx/tchncl/ncmtx/tnws3-
eng.html.  
256 Tax Forms can be found online at http://www.cra-arc.gc.ca/menu/TFTF-e.html.  
257 Tax Guides cab be found online at http://www.cra-arc.gc.ca/menu/TGTG-e.html.  
258 Tax Pamphlets can be found online at http://www.cra-arc.gc.ca/menu/TGTG-e.html.  
259 See Harel v The Deputy Minister of Revenue in the Province of Quebec, [1978] 1 SCR 851; see also R v 
Nowegijick, [1983] SCJ o 5, 83 DTC 5041 (SCC).   
260 See Stickel v MNR, [1972]] FCJ no 53, rev’d on other ground by FCA in 72 DTC 6178 (FCA), subsequently 
affirmed by SCC in 74 DTC 6269 (SCC); see also MNR v Inland Industries, [1971] SCJ No 145. More recently, see 
the Federal Court decision in Teletech Canada v. MNR (2013)  http://www.oba.org/Sections/Taxation-
Law/Articles/Articles-2013/October-2013/TeleTech-Canada,-Inc-v-Minister-of-National-Revenue. 
261 See Woon v MNR, [1950] CTC 263 (Ex Ct).  I have not encountered any recent decisions in respect to such 
rulings, likely because the CRA’s administrative practice.   
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to reduce risk, knowing what the CRA will likely do (whether this is right in law or not) may be 
more important than the correct state of the law. 
However, these publications and pronouncements can have legal effect and are given 
weight, thereby becoming potentially important factors with legal effect, when there is doubt as 
to the meaning of legislation,262 when stopple is an issue, or where the issue is one of proper 
procedure.263 The remedies available on the basis of government publications and 
pronouncements can be purely procedural, or they may be substantive in nature, and the use that 
can be made of such publications will differ depending on what court the proceedings are before.  
For example, the TCC will give little weight to the conduct of the Minister, but will give some 
weight to government publications in interpreting ambiguous/unclear provisions or to statements 
of fact made by the Minister.  The FCTD, on the other hand, will care little about the effect of 
government publication and pronouncements that affect the correctness of the (re)assessment, 
but may give weight to materials that relate to the Minister’s conduct in rendering that 
(re)assessment.   
The FCTD, on judicial review, will consider the conduct of the Minister and compare this 
to publications and pronouncements as to Ministerial conduct.  The court, after review, may 
grant procedural remedies.  Procedural remedies are imported by the doctrine of Legitimate 
Expectations as part of the rules of natural justice and procedural fairness, and they may: 264 
• extend procedural protections beyond what the circumstances may otherwise require,265 
and  
• may determine what procedures the duty of fairness requires in any circumstances.266   
Therefore, the conduct, publications, and statements of the administrative decision-maker are 
useful to the court as an indicator of fairness on the basis of the expert administrator’s view of 
what constitutes fair procedure in the circumstances.267  
The TCC is tasked with determining whether the (re)assessment by the Minister is correct 
in law.  When doing so, the TCC will make use of governmental publications and 
pronouncements.  However, the CRA and other government bodies are not legislative and cannot 
change the law.  Therefore, they cannot change or override a clear expression of law through 
administrative practice, pronouncement, or publication.  Where the legislation is ambiguous, 
                                                
262 See Harel v The Deputy Minister of Revenue in the Province of Quebec, [1978] 1 SCR 851; see also R v 
Nowegijick, [1983] SCJ o 5, 83 DTC 5041 (SCC).   
263 Within bounds of fairness.   
264 Old st Boniface Residents Assn Inc v Winnipeg (City), [1990] 2 SRC 1170; Reference Re Canada Assistance Plan 
(BC), [1991] 2 SCR 525; CUPE v Ontario (Minister of Labour), 2003 SCC 29; Agriria v Canada, 2013 SCC 36. 
265 Old st Boniface Residents Assn Inc v Winnipeg (City), [1990] 2 SRC 1170; Reference Re Canada Assistance Plan 
(BC), [1991] 2 SCR 525; CUPE v Ontario (Minister of Labour), 2003 SCC 29; Agriria v Canada, 2013 SCC 36. 
266 Baker v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] 2 SEC 817. 
267 Martineau v Matsqui Disciplinary Bd, [1980] 1 SCR 603.  The courts will respect the procedure adopted by 
administrative agencies to some extent. So long as the procedures fall within a range of fair procedure, the courts 
will allow the administrative agency to choose its own procedure, thereby employing its experience as to what 
constitutes fair procedure in the circumstances. See also Baker v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 
[1999] 2 SEC 817. 
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then the interpretation bulletins and other similar CRA statements carry real weight.268 
Nevertheless, courts have refused to simply rely on administrative practice when provisions are 
unclear.269  Where the policy contradicts the wording of the provision or, without contradicting 
the wording of the provision, the position is not supported by the legislation, the policy can be of 
no help.270   Specifically, government publications and pronouncements may: 
• be used by courts to determine the implied interpretation of words, phrases, or criteria 
employed by a decision-maker as part of an analysis of the reasonableness of the 
interpretation;271 and  
• be used in interpreting statutory provisions as administrative guidelines are part of the 
broader context of the statute,272 and may help the court to identify the purpose of a 
provision.273 
Finally, as part of the court’s application of the proper standard of review, on judicial 
review before the FCTD, government publications and pronouncements may through the 
operation of the doctrine of Legitimate Expectations: 
• be a useful indicator of what constitutes a reasonable interpretation of the power 
conferred on the decision-maker;274  
• be useful in determining whether the decision rendered by the decision-maker is 
reasonable or not;275 and 
• help determine what the criteria relevant in the exercise of discretion are.276 However, 
whatever the role of guidelines in setting out relevant considerations, the weight to be 
assigned to the relevant factors and the weighting of competing factors is, so long as 
within a range of reasonable decisions, for the decision-maker.277 
                                                
268 See Harel, where the SCC referred to the decisions in The Commissioners for Special Purposes of the Income 
Tax v Pemsel, [1891] AC 531; Protestant Old Ladies’ Home v Provincial treasurer of Prince Edward Island, (1941) 
2 DLR 534, to support its position.  
269 The TCC in Brelco (Brelco Drilling Ltd . v. The Queen, 98 DTC 1422 (T.C.C.) at p 430, reversed on other 
ground, stated that conforming to administrative practice so as to enhance equity among taxpayers is not 
appropriate, and taxpayers “should not feel obliged, because it is expedient, to observe administrative edicts when 
the law is simply lacking in clarity”. 
270 Wollenberg v MNR, 84 DTC 1055 (TCC). This is linked to doctrine of fettering of discretion by an administrative 
decision-maker.   
271 Agriria v Canada, 2013 SCC 36.  Reasonableness of an interpretation will look to the plain words, legislative 
history, evident purpose, and statutory context of the words, phrases, or criteria. 
272 Agriria v Canada, 2013 SCC 36. 
273 Department of Finance explanatory notes are used by the court to determine the purpose or intention of 
parliament in enacting a provision or making a particular amendment, therefore playing a role in the application of 
the modern rule of statutory interpretation.   
274 Baker v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] 2 SEC 817; Agriria v Canada, 2013 SCC 36. 
275 Baker v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] 2 SEC 817; Agriria v Canada, 2013 SCC 36.  
276 CUPE v Ontario (Minister of Labour), 2003 SCC 29, dissenting judgment. The court in CUPE stated that the LE 
as to reasonable criteria may arise from legislation, regulations, international conventions, or guidelines.  The SCC 
in Agriria v Canada, 2013 SCC 36, provided more guidance, and said that criteria stated to be relevant in guidelines 
give rise to a LE that they will be considered, such that they must be considered, where the guidelines are a 
relatively comprehensive code in respect of the decision or exercise of discretion. 
277 Canada v Telfer, 2009 FCA 23. 
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The latter two lists demonstrate the substantive effect that government publications and 
pronouncements may have.  
For example, in the voluntary disclosure program278 context, several cases have held the 
Minister to the conditions and relief set out in the relevant Information Circular.279 In Karia,280 
which was never appealed, the Federal Court held that although the Information Circulars are not 
delegated legislation and have no force of law “as such”,281 promissory estoppel would operate 
to prevent the Minister to exercise discretion contrary to the promise contained in the 
Information Circular (so long as the Minister has the necessary lawful authority).282  But, where 
the requirements for estoppel are not met, the Federal Court has held that Information Circulars 
are not binding on the Minister in the exercise of the Minister’s discretion.283  Outside of the 
estoppel context, guidelines have been held to be relevant in assessing the reasonableness of the 
Minister’s decision, and may therefore reduce the range of reasonable alternatives.284  
Note that these publications and pronouncements will often be relied on by courts when 
they favour the taxpayer and the taxpayer has consulted and relied on them,285 but not when they 
favour the government who drafted them.286   
                                                
278 The voluntary disclosure program uses the discretion of the Minister to waive interest and penalties. 
279 Recently, the FCA in Sifto had to determine whether a taxpayer’s argument had no reasonable prospect of 
success.  The taxpayer argued that once accepted by a Minister as meeting the voluntary disclosure as meeting the 
conditions of the program as set out in the information circular, the Minister was bound to waive the interest and 
penalties applicable.  In discussing remedies, the FCA stated that “the Federal Court may grant a declaration based 
on administrative law principles that the Minister acted unreasonably in failing to waive the penalties, or a 
declaration that the penalties should not have been assessed in the face of the valid voluntary disclosure”. See 
Minister of National Revenue v Sifto Canada Corp, 2014 FCA 140 at para 25 [Sifto]. 
280 Karia v Canada (MNR), 2005 FC 639 [Karia].  Karia was followed in Wong v Canada (National Revenue), 2007 
FC 628).  The decision was cited in 5 decisions, all FC decision.  None said that the estoppel on the basis of the IC 
was wrong in law or called it into question. 
281 Karia, supra note 218 at para 7. 
282 Ibid. at para 9.   
283 For example see Brown v Canada (Customs and Revenue Agency), 2005 FC 1639, at para 27, where the court did 
not discuss estoppel and where it seems to not have been argued, the FC said that Information Circulars “cannot 
exclude all other valid and relevant reasons for which the Minister might exercise his discretionary authority or 
refuse to do so”. 
284 See Telfer v Canada (Canada Revenue Agency), 2008 FC 218, at para 13, citing to Jim's Pizza (1980) Ltd. 
v. Canada (Revenue Agency), 2007 FC 782.  Decision overturned on appeal, 2009 FCA 23, on the basis that the 
decision was not unreasonable.   
285 Ludmer v Canada, [1995] 2 FC 3 (FCA), citing Vaillancourt v. Deputy M.N.R., [1991] 3 F.C. 663 (C.A.), where 
at page 674 the FCA stated:  
I note that the courts are having increasing recourse to such Bulletins and they appear quite willing 
to see an ambiguity in the statute as a reason for using them when the interpretation given in a 
Bulletin squarely contradicts the interpretation suggested by the Department in a given case or 
allows the interpretation put forward by the taxpayer. When a taxpayer engages in business 
activity in response to an expressed inducement by the Government and the legality of that activity 
is confirmed in an Interpretation Bulletin, it is only fair to seek the meaning of the legislation in 
question in that bulletin also. 
286 Canadian Occidental U.S. Petroleum Corp. v. Canada, [2001] T.C.J. No. 112(QL) at para 30. 
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5. Brining it Together 
Solving tax law problems and conducting tax law research is a systematic process aimed 
at reaching a conclusion about a tax problem.  A tax problem will be rooted in particular facts 
and circumstances, the solution will aim to achieve particular goals, and the path to the solution 
will involve presenting information to different persons in different forums.  Knowing what the 
relevant and significant facts are, what the particular goals are, and whom you will need to 
convince so as to solve the problem are pre-requisites to engaging in legal research.   The facts 
will determine the legal issues that must be addressed and explored in the research, the legal 
issues will determine what facts must be established, the desired outcome will determine what 
sources of legal information and which facts are highlighted, and the audience will determine 
how the results of the research are presented.   
This is a cyclical process throughout the research exercise.  Just as the researcher needs to 
re-establish what constitute relevant facts throughout the research process, the researcher must 
revisit the identification of legal issues.  As new facts become arise or old facts become relevant 
the change in the factual matrix may give rise to new legal issues. Also, the exploration of legal 
issues may give rise to additional or secondary issues that must be examined.  After the 
researcher has formulated clear statements of preliminary fact (and assumptions, if necessary), 
clear statements of the initial legal issues, a clear statement as to the purpose of the research, and 
identified the target audience, s/he is ready to begin the legal research process. 
Legal research, particularly in an area where the researcher is not an expert, should start 
with number of good secondary sources that deal with the particular and general area of law 
identified by the facts and posited as issues.  Good secondary sources will provide the researcher 
with an overview of the law, references to other secondary sources (including commercial and 
government publications), references to related provisions in the ITA or related provisions in 
other statutes, and reference to leading cases.  The next step involves reading the text of relevant 
legislation, breaking the provisions down into operating components, and culling the list of 
operating components down to those relevant in a particular case.  In order to understand  
particular provisions, the researcher will have to refer to cases that interpret those provisions, or 
particular words or phrases used in those provisions.  These cases may either be tax cases or non-
tax cases.  After the researcher has formed an understanding of the statutory provisions as 
interpreted by cases, s/he must apply the law to the particular facts of the client and form an 
opinion as to the likely answer to the legal issues raised by those facts. 
In coming to a conclusion, it is important to be aware of the limitations of any particular 
research and opinion.  The researcher’s conclusions must identify and analyze the differences 
between important case facts and the client’s facts, assumptions of fact made, missing or unclear 
facts, changes or proposed changes in the law, uncertainty created by differences between the to 
CRA’s position and the interpretation/opinion of the researcher, trends in court decisions, and 
other relevant matters that introduce uncertainty.  Finally, in forming an opinion or giving 
advice, the tax researcher should remain cognizant of the burden of proof in tax cases.287  It is the 
                                                
287 A brief summary of the burden of proof in tax cases was provided by the TCC in Kosma-Kare Canada Inc v The 
Queen, 2014 TCC 13, where the court made this statement at paragraph 48: 
[The taxpayer/appellant] must put forward a prima facie case showing the inaccuracy of the 
assumptions relied on by the Minister when making the assessment. Such a case is supported by 
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taxpayer who usually bears the burden of demolishing the assumptions of fact made by the 
Minister.288  The assumptions of fact made by the CRA are presumed to be correct because it is 
the taxpayer who is in the best position to know and establish the facts.289  This evidentiary 
burden on the taxpayer makes establishing the facts and understanding whether and how to prove 
those facts, very important.290 
  
                                                                                                                                                       
evidence which creates such a degree of probability in its favour that it must be accepted if 
believed by the Court, unless it is rebutted or the contrary is proved (Stewart v. Canada, [2000] 
T.C.J. No. 53 (QL). If the appellant makes such a prima facie case, the Minister must then refute 
that prima facie case and prove the assumptions he relied upon (Hickman Motors Ltd. v. Canada, 
[1997] 2 S.C.R. 336). However, the initial burden of proof put on the taxpayer cannot be lightly, 
capriciously or casually shifted, since the taxpayer has information within his reach and under his 
control (Orly Automobiles Inc. v. Canada, 2005 FCA 425, [2005] G.S.T.C. 200). 
288 Johnson v MNR, [1948] CTC 195, 3 DTC 1182 (SCC). This burden is an extension of the statutory presumption 
in ITA subsection 152(8) that an assessment is deemed to be valid.   
Note that the Minister bears the burden of proof on the imposition of penalties. See for example Dymond v MNR 90 
DTC 1920 (TCC). 
289 For an analysis of the onus on the taxpayer see Kroft and Douglas, “Onus and Standard of Proof in Canadian Tax 
Litigation: An Update” (2012) in Tax Dispute Resolution, Compliance and Administration Conference Report 
(Canadian Tax Foundation: Toronto, ON, 2013). 
290 In MNR v Pillsbury Holdings Ltd, 64 DTC 5158 (Ex Ct), the court identified the three ways in which a taxpayer 
can discharge this burden: 
• By challenging the Minister’s allegation that s/he did assume certain facts; 
• By assuming the onus of showing that one or more of the assumptions is wrong; or 
• By contending that, even if the assumptions made are justified, the assumptions do not by themselves 
support the assessment made.   
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Appendix 1 – Functional classification of the ITA 
Function Sections 
Liability   to tax and Computing Income 2 – 4 
Employment   Income 5 – 8 
Business   and Property Income 9 – 37 
Capital   Gains 38 – 55 
Other   Sources of Income 56 – 59.1 
Deductions   in Computing Income 60 – 66.8 
General Rules   for Computing Income 67 – 69 
Death,  Family transfers, Income Splitting 70 – 75.2 
Debts 76 – 80.5 
Amounts   not Included in Income 81 
Corporate   Income 82 – 89 
Shareholders   of Non-resident Corporations 90 – 95 
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